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Series Foreword
“Media determine our situation,” Friedrich Kittler infamously wrote 
in his Introduction to Gramophone, Film, Typewriter. Although this 
dictum is certainly extreme— and media archaeology has been 
critiqued for being overly dramatic and focused on technological 
developments— it propels us to keep thinking about media as 
setting the terms for which we live, socialize, communicate, orga-
nize, do scholarship, et cetera. After all, as Kittler continued in his 
opening statement almost thirty years ago, our situation, “in spite 
or because” of media, “deserves a description.” What, then, are the 
terms— the limits, the conditions, the periods, the relations, the 
phrases— of media? And, what is the relationship between these 
terms and determination? This book series, In Search of Media, 
answers these questions by investigating the often elliptical “terms 
of media” under which users operate. That is, rather than produce 
a series of explanatory keyword- based texts to describe media 
practices, the goal is to understand the conditions (the “terms”) 
under which media is produced, as well as the ways in which media 
impacts and changes these terms.
Clearly, the rise of search engines has fostered the proliferation 
and predominance of keywords and terms. At the same time, it 
has changed the very nature of keywords, since now any word 
and pattern can become “key.” Even further, it has transformed 
the very process of learning, since search presumes that, (a) with 
the right phrase, any question can be answered and (b) that the 
answers lie within the database. The truth, in other words, is “in 
viii there.” The impact of search/media on knowledge, however, goes 
beyond search engines. Increasingly, disciplines— from sociology to 
economics, from the arts to literature— are in search of media as 
a way to revitalize their methods and objects of study. Our current 
media situation therefore seems to imply a new term, understood 
as temporal shifts of mediatic conditioning. Most broadly, then, this 
series asks: What are the terms or conditions of knowledge itself?
To answer this question, each book features interventions by 
two (or more) authors, whose approach to a term— to begin with: 
communication, pattern discrimination, markets, remain, machine— 
diverge and converge in surprising ways. By pairing up scholars 
from North America and Europe, this series also advances media 
theory by obviating the proverbial “ten year gap” that exists across 
language barriers due to the vagaries of translation and local 
academic customs. The series aims to provoke new descriptions, 
prescriptions, and hypotheses— to rethink and reimagine what 
media can and must do.
Introduction
Clemens Apprich
By now, the fact that social networks create “echo chambers” 
has become a truism. As we know from Greek mythology, Echo, 
the loquacious mountain nymph, was condemned to repeating 
phrases— as a punishment for helping Zeus hide his many affairs 
from Hera. Rejected by Narcissus, she wasted away until nothing 
but an echo remained. Narcissus in turn— as punishment for 
his many cruel rejections— fell in love with his own image and 
then killed himself, a victim of unrequited love. Hence, one may 
conclude, the inability to respond to others makes reciprocal 
exchange impossible and isolates the individual. In a narcissistic 
culture of self- affirmation, fostered by algorithmic personalization, 
communality— if not democracy— allegedly has been destroyed. 
But this analogy misses a deeper implication of the sociotechnical 
transformation. Concealed behind the “echo chambers” and 
“filter bubbles” of social media is an incredibly reductive identity 
politics, which posits class, race, and gender as “immutable” 
categories. Hence, at a time in which Western democracies have 
become “postracial” and vocal conservative and liberal- progressive 
critics within the humanities have declared studies of race/class/
gender/sexuality passé, identity has returned with a vengeance— 
that is, if it ever left.
To understand the kinds of identity politics enabled by network 
technologies, this book examines a fundamental axiom of compu-
tational cultures: pattern discrimination. While the word discrimi-
nation originates from the Latin verb discriminare, where it simply 
x means “to separate, to distinguish, or to make a distinction,” it was 
in the late nineteenth century that it became overtly political. In 
parallel to the development of racist ideology, discrimination since 
then has referred to a prejudicial treatment of individuals based on 
a social category (e.g., race, gender, sexuality, age, class). However, 
in different terminologies the original meaning of the term has 
been preserved. This is why in computer science “pattern discrim-
ination” is still used as a technical term to describe the imposition 
of identity on input data, in order to filter (i.e., to discriminate) 
information from it. But far from being a neutral process, the 
delineation and application of patterns is in itself a highly political 
issue, even if hidden behind a technical terminology. The point of 
this book is to trace and uncover the implicit ties between the ideo-
logical and technical uses of discrimination, as we can experience it 
in algorithmically enhanced systems of pattern recognition.
What would happen if we took discrimination with regard to 
data- driven politics seriously and built systems that acknowledged 
the fundamental fluidity of identity? What would happen if network 
science and Big Data met critical theory? In her essay, Hito Steyerl 
offers a taste of what this could mean. She shows us the hardwired 
ideologies of a machinic vision, in which data builds the basis of 
our reality. However, this reality doesn’t necessarily match with the 
catchphrases of the data industry. Rather than a smooth operation, 
algorithmically enhanced pattern recognition struggles with a 
massive amount of real— that is, dirty— data. As Steyerl explains, 
algorithms must constantly fix the mess that we call life. And just 
like in real life, the criteria to decide what to include and exclude 
are intrinsically political. But then why is it that there is almost no 
discussion about the implicit racist, sexist, and classist assumptions 
within network analytics? How, in other words, can we have a 
serious debate about Big Data and pattern discrimination if most 
people (or their data) are either blanked or don’t really care? This 
is the question Florian Cramer tackles in his text by contrasting 
computer analytics with classical hermeneutics. Instead of a 
narrative function based on syntax, computers employ statistical 
ximethods, thereby leaving behind older concepts of critical inter-
pretation. But since data is never pure and analytics never fully 
objective, interpretation— and thus hermeneutics— recurs through 
the back door of computational analytics. In this sense, allegedly 
“old” concepts of the humanities may give us a key to the enigma 
of pattern discrimination: “interpretation,” “meaning,” “identity,” 
or “subjectivity” are well- explored terms that can and should be 
taken into account when it comes to a better understanding of our 
digitized and networked world.
That our world is currently remodeled by network science as the 
science of neoliberalism is the central observation of Wendy Hui 
Kyong Chun. In her piece she dissects the concept of homophily, 
which grounds the breakdown of seemingly open and boundless 
networks into a series of poorly gated communities, a fragmenta-
tion further fostered by the agent- based market logic embedded 
within most capture systems. If networks segregate, it is because 
network analyses rest on and perpetuate a reductive identity 
politics, which posits race and gender as “immutable” categories 
and love as inherently “love of the same.” Her point is neither to 
dismiss nor to villainize network science; rather, the article calls for 
more interdisciplinary intersections, so that we can understand the 
“performative” nature of networks in all the senses of the word: 
they both enact what they describe and create their alleged subject 
via repetitious acts.
In his concluding piece, Clemens Apprich takes up the epistemo-
logical problem of pattern discrimination on the basis of new ways 
of perception, representation, and knowledge that are generated 
by the shift from mass media to social media. The transition from 
one media system to another, he argues, creates a set of paranoid 
effects, which can be read as the attempt to adapt to this change. 
Beyond the colloquial understanding of paranoia, Apprich’s text 
refers to its productive moment, when the subject, after having 
experienced a rupture in the symbolic order, tries to reappropriate 
reality. In times of Big Data, when our traditional patterns of 
interpretation have no real bite anymore, we must ask how the 
xii “paranoid thinking machine” can be put to different ends, in order 
to reconstitute the world.
The articles collected in this volume do not deny that Big Data,  
machine learning, and network analytics constitute a new 
authority— after the divine and the rational. But they do plead for 
a certain serenity, for a strategic step back to not get caught in the 
narcissistic admiration of our own image. Because this is what dig-
ital cultures ultimately are: the reflection of our own lives— messy, 
beautiful, and unjust.
[ 1 ]
A Sea of Data:  
Pattern Recognition 
and Corporate Animism 
(Forked Version)
Hito Steyerl
What is recognition? Remember the famous primordial scene 
of (self)- recognition described by Louis Althusser: a policeman 
hails someone in the street yelling “Hey you!” In that moment the 
person is supposed to recognize himself both as subject (“you”) 
and as subjected to the policeman’s authority (“hey!”). “Hey you!” 
is the primary formula of social control, the most basic pattern of 
personal and political recognition. The categories of knowledge, 
control, and privilege are established with one single gesture 
(Althusser 1971, 163).
But today the situation is more complicated. Gone are the days 
when it was about one person walking down the street. It’s not 
five, five thousand, or even five million people crossing the street 
but 414 trillion bits, the approximate amount of data traveling 
the internet per second. Imagine the policeman standing there 
trying to yell: “hey you!” at every single one of them. It must be 
flabbergasting. On top of that he has to figure out whether they are 
sent by a spam bot, a trader, a porn website, a solar flare, Daesh, 
your mum, or what. Imagine Althusser’s scenario of recognition 
2 translated to this reality and you get this desperate plea for 
assistance: “Developers, please help! We’re drowning (not waving) 
in a sea of data— with data, data everywhere, but not a drop of in-
formation” (Sontheimer 2015). This quote is part of a series of texts 
called “Signal v. Noise” posted to the NSA’s internal website from 
2011 to 2012. Its author complains of an overload of intercepted 
data: “It’s not about the data or even access to the data. It’s about 
getting information from the truckloads of data . . .” (Sontheimer 
2015). In the NSA’s description, data are an overwhelming ocean, 
more landscape than library, more raw material than focused 
message, more taken than givens. Secret services randomly siphon 
off “truckloads” of data. But the sheer volume of traffic becomes 
a source of bewildering opacity. This problem is not restricted to 
secret services however. Even WikiLeak’s Julian Assange himself has 
said, “We are drowning in material” (Sontheimer 2015).
Pattern Recognition
This is where pattern recognition comes into play. The NSA 
columns’ main question is how to extract a signal from the noise 
of excessive data. The answer is: by “discovering patterns in large 
data sets” (Wikipedia 2017a). This happens via: “the analysis of 
large quantities of data to extract previously unknown, interesting 
patterns” (Wikipedia 2017b) like dependencies, clusters, or an-
omalies. Althusser’s overwhelmed cop gets thrown a lifeline. The 
people he was supposed to hail are now patterns of life extracted 
from geolocation data, phone records, social media trawling, and 
online shop cookies. They are subjected to continuous surveillance 
by governments, corporations, their own cars, and Barbie dolls. It’s 
now a question of defining flocks, swarms, rhythms, and constel-
lations within the deafening noise of intercepted data. But how 
exactly to separate signal and noise, or maybe rather how to define 
them in the first place?
Jacques Rancière tells a mythical story— or maybe let’s call this kind 
of story a political fable— about how this might have been done 
3in ancient Greece. How did people distinguish signal from noise 
back then? Sounds produced by affluent male locals were defined 
as speech, whereas women, children, slaves, and foreigners were 
assumed to produce garbled noise. The distinction between speech 
and noise served as a kind of political spam filter. Those identi-
fied as speaking were labeled citizens and the rest as irrelevant, 
irrational, and potentially dangerous nuisances. Similarly, today, 
the question of separating signal and noise has a fundamental 
political dimension. Dividing signal and noise means not only to 
“filter” patterns but also to create them in the first place. What 
does an “anomaly” exactly mean in pattern “recognition”? As with 
the gesture of Althusser’s cop, “recognition” creates subjects and 
subjection, knowledge, authority, and as Rancière adds, neatly 
stacked categories of people. Pattern recognition is, besides many 
other things, also a fundamentally political operation.
In 1988 Fredric Jameson declared paranoia to be one of the 
main cultural patterns of postmodern narrative, pervading the 
political unconscious.1 According to Jameson, the totality of social 
relations could not be culturally represented within the Cold War 
imagination— and the blanks were filled in by delusions, conjecture, 
and whacky plots featuring Freemason logos (Jameson 2009, 15). 
Today, however, apophenia replaces paranoia.2
How is this? After Edward Snowden’s leaks, one thing became clear: 
many conspiracy theories were actually true (cf. Sprenger 2015). 
Worse, they were outdone by reality. Post- Snowden, any specula-
tion about hidden plots or guesswork about intrigue and unlawful 
behind- the- scenes activities became outdated. One didn’t have to 
speculate anymore about conspiracy; there was evidence to prove 
it. This does not mean there is no more secrecy. There is. But the 
same structural conditions that allow ubiquitous surveillance— 
leaky and unevenly regulated information architectures— also 
continue to benefit bottom- up exposure— which on the other 
hand could be totally fake. Potentially all information— at least a 
lot of it— is removed from the control of its authors once digitally 
transmitted; any piece of information can and likely will become 
4 public at some point in time, regardless if it is factual or not— and 
more often, it’s not. The only paranoia that still makes sense is pure 
reality: a scenario deemed vastly unlikely by all but some experts 
has become actual.
Additionally Jameson’s totality— the sum of social relations— has 
taken on a different form. It is not absent; on the contrary, it is 
rampant. Totality has returned with a vengeance in the form of 
oceanic “truckloads of data.” Social relations are distilled as contact 
metadata, relational graphs, infection- spread maps, or just a heap 
of fake news.
This quantified version of social relations is just as readily deployed 
for police operations as for targeted advertising, for personalized 
clickbait, eyeball tracking, and proprietary feed algorithms. It works 
both as social profiling and commodity form. Kloutscore- based 
A- list, black ads marketing, and presidential kill list are based on 
similar proprietary operations. Today totality comes as probabilistic 
notation that includes your fuckability as well as disposability 
ratings, not to mention precise estimates of your skin color. It 
catalogues affiliation, association, addiction; it converts patterns of 
life into death by Hellfire missile.
This type of totality is also the necessary counterpart of messianic 
expectations of singularity. Singularity— the pet myth of Californian 
ideology— describes a time when artificial intelligences take over.
According to Jameson, singularity is also characteristic of a period 
in which general rules no longer apply.3 It’s case by case instead; 
or rather, every case for itself. Singularity is a California fantasy of 
Weltgeist, this time riding a Lethal Autonomous Weapons System 
enabled by spontaneous jurisdiction, a scarce rule of law, and 
SKYNET metadata. However, the real singularity of our times is 
most obviously the semi- divine mythical entity called the markets, 
a set of organizations regarded as both autonomous and super-
intelligent, of such providence, by the way, beautiful providence, 
that human reasoning has to bow to its vast superiority. This is the 
real- existing singularity in our times, an entity allegedly endowed 
5with a superhuman intelligence that can under no circumstances 
be questioned.
The corresponding totalities are taken care of by apophenia and 
pattern recognition. Pattern recognition formulas sift through 
truckloads of humble and seemingly trivial data sets divined 
from the entrails of online shopping and massively multiplayer 
online gaming.4 No interaction is too modest or menial to be 
scanned, stored, and saved for eternity. A singularity in which 
every case is unique correlates to a totality governed by probability 
management.
If paranoia was a standard Cold War narrative, apophenia happens 
when narrative breaks down and causality has to be recognized— 
or invented— across a cacophony of spam, spin, fake, and gadget 
chatter.
This is also reflected in contemporary paradigms of truthfulness. 
The five W questions of traditional inquiry— who, what, where, 
when, and why— have been replaced with the seven V’s of Big Data 
processing: velocity, variety, volume, veracity, variability, visualiza-
tion, and value. Veracity is no longer produced by verifying facts. 
It’s a matter, as one big- data expert put it, to cleanse “ ‘dirty data’ ” 
from your systems5 (Normandeau 2013). So what are dirty data? 
Here is one example:
Sullivan, from Booz Allen, gave the example the time 
his team was analyzing demographic information about 
customers for a luxury hotel chain and came across data 
showing that teens from a wealthy Middle Eastern coun-
try were frequent guests.
“There were a whole group of 17 year- olds staying at 
the properties worldwide,” Sullivan said. “We thought, 
‘That can’t be true.’ ” (Kopytoff 2014)
The data was thus dismissed as dirty data, before someone found 
out that, indeed, it was true. Brown teenagers, in this worldview, 
are likely to exist. Dead brown teenagers? Also highly probable.  
6 But rich brown teenagers? This is so improbable that they must 
be dirty data and cleansed from the system! The pattern emerg-
ing from this operation to separate noise and signal is not very 
different from Rancière’s political noise filter for allocating citi-
zenship, rationality, and privilege. Affluent brown teenagers seem 
just as unlikely as speaking slaves and women in the Greek polis. 
Had the researchers uncovered that seventeen- year- old brown 
teenagers were likely to be shot dead by police at their properties 
they wouldn’t have flinched but rather worked on a targeted email 
campaign promising discounts for premium demise.
Probability enters truth production on an extensive scale with the 
unsurprising effect that the patterns supposed to be uncovered in 
massive data correspond to some degree with the patterns that 
are already assumed to be found there. On the other hand, though, 
dirty data are something like a cache of surreptitious subaltern 
refusal; they express a refusal to be counted and measured:
A study of more than 2,400 UK consumers by research 
company Verve found that 60% intentionally provided 
wrong information when submitting personal details 
online. Almost one quarter (23%) said they sometimes 
gave out incorrect dates of birth, for example, while 9% 
said they did this most of the time and 5% always did it.6 
(Cabrera 2015)
Dirty data is where all your and my refusals to fill a constant on-
slaught of online forms accumulate. Everyone is lying all the time, 
whenever possible, or at least cutting corners. Not surprisingly, 
the most “dirty” area of data collection is consistently pointed out 
to be the (U.S.) health sector. Doctors and nurses are singled out 
for filling out forms incorrectly, sometimes even going as far as 
to abbreviate “gpa” for “grandpa,” a move that deeply baffles and 
confounds data- mining operations. It seems health professionals 
are just as enthusiastic about filling forms for systems that are 
supposed to replace them as consumers are to perform clerical 
work for corporations that will spam them in turn.
7In his book The Utopia of Rules David Graeber gives a profoundly 
moving example of the forced extraction of data. After his mom 
suffered a stroke he went through the ordeal of having to apply for 
Medicaid on her behalf.
I had to spend over a month not long after dealing with 
the ramifying consequences of the act of whatever anon-
ymous functionary in the New York Department of Motor 
Vehicles had inscribed my given name as “Daid,” not 
to mention the Verizon clerk who spelled my surname 
“Grueber.” Bureaucracies public and private appear— for 
whatever historical reasons— to be organized in such a 
way as to guarantee that a significant proportion of actors 
will not be able to perform their tasks as expected. (Grae-
ber 2015, 71)
Graeber goes on to call this an example of utopian thinking. Bu-
reaucracy is based on utopian thinking because it assumes people 
to be perfect from its own point of view. Dirty data are simply real 
data in the sense of documenting the struggle of real people with 
a bureaucracy that exploits for its own ends the reality of unevenly 
implemented digital technology with all its real- life defects. Grae-
bers mother died before she was accepted into the Medicaid pro-
gram. The endless labor of filling completely meaningless forms is 
a new form of domestic labor in the sense that it is not considered 
labor at all and assumed to be provided “voluntarily” or performed 
by underpaid so- called data janitors. Yet all the seemingly swift and 
invisible action of algorithms, their elegant optimization of every-
thing, their recognition of patterns and anomalies, are based on 
the endless and utterly senseless labor of providing the required or 
even utterly useless data.
Dirty data thus become, so to speak, a remainder of reality in 
systems that are pegged to ideal models, averages, and Platonic 
assumptions, inspired by an ideal fictional world in which brown 
teens are poor by default, doctors just love to cooperate with 
attempts to get rid of them entirely and people trying to claim 
8benefits are anomalies by definition and get treated (or are left 
untreated) accordingly. Sometimes “dirty data” record the passive 
resistance against permanent extraction of unacknowledged labor. 
This “signal” however is partly already determined by probability 
and preexisting models.
Corporate Animism
A brilliant example for apophenic pattern recognition was recently 
provided by a Google development team.7 The point is that in order 
to “recognize” anything, neural networks need first to be taught 
what to recognize. Then, in a quite predictable loop they end up 
“recognizing” the things they were taught.
In Google’s brilliant experiment, image recognition filters were 
looped on sheer random noise. There was nothing to recognize 
[Figure 1.1.] 33rd square. Google’s Deep Dream Generator. [Screenshot, 2015, available 
at http://www.33rdsquare.com/2015/06/googles-inceptionism-lets-us-look-at.html, 
Accessed March 31, 2018.]
9since nothing was represented or even hidden in the noise. But 
the shapes that started emerging were combinations of the shapes 
and animals the networks had been taught to “see” earlier on. They 
ended up “over- recognizing” these shapes, so to speak.
This process reveals the presets of computer vision, its hard-
wired ideologies and preferences. The result: a rainbow- colored 
mess of disembodied fractal eyes, mostly without lids, inces-
santly surveilling their audience in a strident display of pattern 
over- identification.
Google calls the act of creating pattern or image from noise 
“inceptionism.” It also calls this mode of image production “deep 
dreaming.” But in a very materialist sense, these entities are far 
from hallucinations. If they are dreams, those dreams can be 
interpreted as condensations or displacements of the current 
technological disposition. They reveal how signal and noise are  
defined by preexisting categories and probability. If you had 
trained a neural network to “recognize” Hegel’s master and slaves, 
you might have ended up with sheer noise miraculously transform-
ing into Instagrams of an Art Basel Miami VIP preview staffed with 
temp catering workers.
In a feat of unexpected genius, inceptionism manages to visualize 
the unconscious of prosumer networks:8 images surveilling users, 
constantly registering their eye movements, behavior, and prefer-
ences, in aesthetic terms helplessly adrift between a knockoff of a 
Hundertwasser coffee mug and an Art Deco frieze gone ballistic. 
They show not so much the so- called Five Eyes of state surveillance 
but the Eyes Unlimited of corporate surveillance, state surveillance, 
deep state surveillance, academic ranking scores, likability metrics, 
and so on and so on: Walter Benjamin’s “optical unconscious” 
updated to the unconscious of computational image production 
(Benjamin 1974).
By “recognizing” things that were “not given,” inceptionist neural 
networks eventually end up effectively identifying a new totality 
10 of aesthetic and social relations. They visualize the filters of 
computational vision. Presets are applied, regardless whether they 
“apply” or not: “The results are intriguing— even a relatively simple 
neural network can be used to over- interpret an image, just like as 
children we enjoyed watching clouds and interpreting the random 
shapes” (Mordvintsev, Olah, and Tyka 2015).
Inceptionist image production is decisively different from previous 
chemical or even electronic photographic procedures, posing new 
questions concerning realism and veracity. If previous techniques 
relied on myths of mechanical or optical “objectivity” and ulti-
mately on optics and geometry, in the case of inceptionist image 
production vision appears to rely on pattern recognition, based 
on implanting pseudo- platonic forms into sensing technology and 
running the lot on petabytes of spam. The verisimilitude of vision 
is not based on assumptions about objective hardware but on 
the replication of brain functions (or what are currently believed 
to be brain functions). But in terms of veracity, this is a terrible 
choice indeed; no one really thinks that human brains make 
good witnesses. They project, speculate, invent, embellish, forget, 
and extrapolate. They also see faces in clouds, sometimes. As a 
consequence, cameras based on brain functions provide dubious 
testimony. Reproduction of reality becomes a matter of likelihood. 
Likeness collapses into probability.
But inceptionism is not just a digital hallucination. It is a document 
of an era that trains its smart phones to identify kittens, thus 
hardwiring truly terrifying jargons of cutesy into its means of pro-
sumption. It demonstrates a version of corporate animism in which 
commodities are not only fetishes but dreamed- up, franchised 
chimeras. Yet these are deeply realist representations. According 
to Györgi Lukács, “classical realism” creates “typical characters” as 
they represent the objective social (and in this case technological) 
forces of our times (Idris 2005). Thus, inceptionism unlocks the 
black box of image recognition to release an almost medieval zoo 
of phantasmagoric creatures locked inside.
11
Inceptionism gives those forces a face— or more precisely un-
limited eyes. The creature that stares at you from your plate of 
meatballs is not an amphibian beagle, though. It is the ubiquitous 
surveillance of networked image production, a type of memetically 
modified intelligence that watches you in the form of the lunch that 
you will Instagram in a second if it doesn’t attack you first.
Imagine a world of enslaved objects remorsefully scrutinizing 
you. Your car, your yacht, your art collection is watching you with 
a gloomy and utterly depressed expression. You may own us, 
they seem to say, but we’re going to inform on you. You will start 
missing Althusser’s lonely police officer, because now you are being 
interpellated 24/7 by a serving of dog pasta. And then just guess as 
to what kind of creature we’ll re- cognize in you!
This question of recognition recalls and reveals the enduring 
power of the Turing test as a mode of identification and reveals 
the segregation at the core of assessing machine learning. Turing’s 
[Figure 1.2.] A plate of spaghetti meatballs returning our gaze. [Image: Thorne Brandt, 
available at: https://twitter.com/thornebrandt/status/617173618238332928?lang=en, 
accessed August 1, 2018.]
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game was successful if a machine had the same ability as a human 
to confuse an interrogator about its gender. But contemporary 
computation is not about confusion of identity but multiplication 
of identities. Facebook, for example, has modified the imitation 
game to say: if you don’t want to identify as man or as woman 
that’s fine, but please check one of these fifty- plus boxes to state 
your precisely defined other type of gender, and we’ll make sure to 
send you the appropriate adds. This is not an imitation game but 
an identification game.
Similarity— or correlation— as mathematical evidence is something 
Turing discussed as well. To challenge his own ideas, he cited the 
objection that machines could never bond over strawberries and 
cream like humans. But he answered his own challenge with a 
complex twist: Yes, a machine cannot bond with a man in the same 
way that a white man will bond with a white man over strawberries 
with cream and a black man will bond with a black man over straw-
[Figure 1.3.] The shape in this flock of birds over New York appears to be the face of 
President Vladimir Putin. [Screenshot of video by Sheryl Gilbert, available at: https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=h-7-Ej_NuIg, accessed August 1, 2018.]
13berries with cream. But— and this is my conclusion, not Turing’s— if 
a machine reproduced this behavior, would this machine then be 
thinking?9
Some people think so. Because the idea of white guys bonding over 
strawberries and cream has moved to the heart of social- network 
analysis. This is a pristine example of so- called homophily, a con-
cept further discussed by Wendy Chun (see Chun in this volume). 
Homophily means that people like to bond with similar people. 
How could this produce mathematical evidence of anything? If 
white men mostly have strawberries and cream with white men, 
this means that whoever a white man has strawberries with is most 
likely a white man. This is what Facebook packages into the idea 
that you are like what you like, and that you will like the things that 
people who are like you like. This is how they sell you strawberries 
with cream. And this is also how Google concludes you are not 
a robot. You are not a robot because someone who likes similar 
things checked the box to say he is not a robot and this applies 
to you by correlation. If you extend this thinking to the imitation 
game, you can guess not only the gender of all the players but all 
their friends and their social network. This is how the game starts 
transgressing its own boundaries and slowly becomes real.
So there are two completely different games at hand. On the one 
hand, the identification game: if something looks like something, 
it is the same. All boxes get checked. On the other hand, Turing’s 
imitation game: maybe something that looks similar is the same. 
It’s definitely possible that someone who comes across as a man is 
a man. Then again maybe not. At this point, a thinking machine will 
decide that this is not the interrogator’s business. The best choice 
is to politely move on to a protracted and paradoxical discussion of 
the weather.
Apophenia
Inceptionism proves that pattern recognition also exists where 
there is no pattern but a form is detected nevertheless. This 
14 process is called apophenia.10 A major example of this is to recog-
nize creatures in clouds. Apophenia is defined as the perception 
of random patterns within random data. As Benjamin Bratton 
recently argued, apophenia is about “drawing connections and 
conclusions from sources with no direct connection other than 
their indissoluble perceptual simultaneity” (Bratton 2013).
Are the patterns “recognized” in the sea of data today just supersti-
tious mumbo- jumbo? Is apophenia an updated form of divination? 
Photography was once famously described as soothsaying by 
Walter Benjamin: “[I]s not every corner of our cities a scene of 
action? Is not each passerby an actor? Is it not the task of the 
photographer—descendant of the augurs and the haruspices— 
to uncover guilt and name the guilty in his pictures?“ (Benjamin 
1974, 25).
Still, there is a crucial distinction between the twentieth- century 
photographer and the filterers and analysts of the twenty- first. The 
new pattern extractors are not mainly supposed to recognize the 
guilty after the fact. They are expected to predict the perpetrator 
as well as the crime before it has been able to occur. Every spot 
of our cities is mapped out as a probable crime site, fully decked 
with gender- and age- based targeted advertising, and surveilled by 
animated commodities, divinatory cellphone cameras, and aerial 
views from tapped drones.
The twenty- first- century augur creates the image before the event, 
anticipating its effect and calling forth reality. The arrow of time 
has reversed, but the flow of time is unstable and has become 
essentially unpredictable.
However apophenia also has a creative aspect.
Back in the Neolithic, humans imagined star constellations and ob-
served patterns of movement by projecting animal shapes into the 
skies. Let’s say they saw a crab and called this constellation Cancer. 
Even though there was no actual crab in space, constellations like 
15these served as working hypotheses to eventually come up with 
fundamentally different worldviews.
One could laugh about the poor naïve people of the period who 
insisted on seeing nonexistent shapes in the skies. But by tena-
ciously sticking to projecting fictional figures into the cosmos, the 
fundamental movements of the solar system were uncovered. This 
didn’t happen, though, because people believed crabs were walking 
in the cosmos; this happened because people came eventually to 
realize that there were (most probably) no crabs in the cosmos. 
Had they not they “seen” them though, they might have missed 
defining patterns in the movements of planets. But they would 
have also missed the patterns if they hadn’t given up on the literal 
reality of the crabs.
But even more importantly all these activities also completely 
changed the organization of society. The analysis of planetary and 
star movements enabled the development of the calendar and 
agriculture. Cue irrigation, storage, breeding, architecture, sed-
entary lifestyles, and so on. Storage created the idea of property. 
Bands of hunters and gatherers were replaced by proto- states 
of farmer- kings and slaveholders, by vertical social hierarchies. 
Apophenia— as a part of magical thinking— contributed to all these 
transformations.
But what are we going to make of contemporary acts of apophe-
nia? Are we to assume that computer vision has entered its own 
Neolithic phase of magical thinking and pattern projection? But if 
this is the case, one thing is very different. To keep expressing this 
through the example of crabs in space: computer vision still seems 
to be in the phase where it thinks that there really are crabs in 
space and that the patterns emerging from the cosmos of data are 
actually reality. Software engineers like saying about computers: 
garbage in, garbage out. In divinationist computer vision let’s 
rephrase this as: crab in, crap out. Let’s see faeces in clouds, while 
we are at it!
16 It might be more accurate though to assume that humanity 
has entered a second Neolithic, a phase of the reinvention of 
the technologies invented during this period. Today a lot of 
data- related vocabulary refers back to techniques first developed 
during the Neolithic. Data farming and harvesting, mining, and 
extraction point back to agricultural and metallurgic procedures. 
Today, expressions of life as reflected in data trails become a 
farmable, harvestable, minable resource managed by informational 
biopolitics. The stones and ores of the Neolithic are replaced by 
coltane, silicone, and Minecraft Red Stone. So what is the function 
of apophenia now, when new procedures of pattern “recognition” 
threaten to create new types of kings and slaveholders?11
Outside
Let’s think back to the beginning and Althusser’s policeman yelling, 
“Hey you!” In fact this really did happen to a person called George 
Michael, when he was apprehended in a Beverly Hills toilet after a 
plainclothes policeman had encouraged him to commit what U.S. 
legal jargon calls a “lewd” act. Michael was hailed, apprehended, 
and jailed. He had incorrectly recognized the pattern, or rather he 
had been duped into believing he was being chatted up. As a result 
LAPD went all “Hey you!” on poor George.
Arguably Michael has misinterpreted a pattern: he mistook a 
policeman yelling “Hey you” for a lover, an act of apophenia if there 
ever was one. And predictably, scorn and ridicule poured over him.
But, instead of apologizing or admitting an error of judgment, 
Michael brilliantly insisted on his perspective. He released a video 
called “Outside” in which this scene is retold and roles are flipped 
over; the men’s lavatory turns into a dance floor, disco balls pop 
from the ceiling and squadrons of gay biker cops dance with one 
another. After all who said one needs to accept the LAPD’s idea of a 
proper subjected subject? Michael insisted on recognizing patterns 
differently: “Hey you!” is not only an act of subjection but perhaps 
the most basic act of human communication, an act of acknowledg-
17ment and contact, perhaps even seduction. “Outside” was not only 
a coming out, not only a claiming of public space, but also an act of 
defiant apophenia.
This type of apophenia can cause serendipitous misreadings or end 
you up in jail, that is, but at least not as a docile subjected subject. 
It (mis- )reads the letter of the law for a love letter, it insists on not 
recognizing the other at all but rather knowing them in the biblical 
sense, not as sea of data but as flow of energy, not as pattern- of- 
life but as wave of desire. Who got the point— the tons of morons 
who laughed about George for not “getting it right,” or George, who 
got it left so to speak and just cruised ahead of the pattern?
This is why I suggest we follow him and go outside, right now. 
Let’s go.12
Coming in
But, wait. Where is outside? This question is less simple than it 
seems. And it may well turn out we don’t have to go anywhere at all 
because we are outside already. At least the NSA thinks so. Didn’t 
their writer complain about the “sea of data— data, data every-
where, but not one drop of information?”
Isn’t this “sea of data” a big outside, in the most romantic and 
sublime sense of the word? An “unknown unknown” in Donald 
Rumsfeld’s inimitable definition? Doesn’t it look like the “big out-
doors” heroically tackled by speculative realists? At the very least 
this wild and life- threatening sea of data is certainly not “the sofa” 
George Michael emphatically declares he’s done with.
To give a bit less romantic examples: in terms of political geogra-
phy the outside is increasingly difficult to pin down. More and more 
spaces are converted into extraterritorial enclaves and duty- free 
gated communities, into para- statelets and anti- “terrorist” oper-
ation zones, offshore entities and corporate proxy concessions, 
a configuration for which Keller Easterling brilliantly coined the 
term ExtraStateCraft (Easterling 2014). These areas are not— and 
18 this is crucial— outside of the system of nation- states but within, 
in- between, and in certain cases also over and underneath. We see 
this happening when— as in Lebanon or Italy— the idea of garbage 
in, garbage out no longer works. Instead it’s garbage in, garbage 
in- between, garbage all over, and more to come. It’s garbage 
inside out.
But if many of us are outside in already, either as dirty or clean 
data, as signal or noise, Graeber or Grueber; isn’t a “coming out” at 
the same time a “coming in”?
Actually this is exactly how George Michael continues his argument. 
The “outside” is not about the romantic great outdoors of icebergs 
and posthuman reason, not about calculating being nor divining 
online shopping craves, nor terrorist threats from petabytes of 
garbage. “Outside” means: servicing the community of flesh and bone 
(nothing more).13
He sings:
And yes, I’ve been bad
Doctor, won’t you do with me what you can
You see I think about it all the time
I’d service the community
(but I already have you see!)
I never really said it before
There’s nothing here but flesh and bone
There’s nothing more, nothing more
There’s nothing more
Let’s go outside
Mr. Michael counterinterpellates the policeman by challenging him 
to service the community. His version of a policeman does exactly 
that. But this community is no longer the same either. It is not a 
world where people end up as dirty data and dead brown teenag-
ers, stuck with overflowing garbage in the paradoxical no- man’s- 
lands of statistical bureaucracy and overall exception.
Rather this needs to be a world in which everything looks just 
the same, just seen from a completely different angle. How does 
19this work? Imagine someone who was sent out into space to 
investigate whether the pattern that was detected in the endlessly 
vast data set of the cosmos is actually there. In the Neolithic this 
was impossible but not now. Let’s say the predicted pattern is: 
alien intelligence exists, it is evil and everywhere, and in order to 
create patterns to contain it, we need to compute all the data in 
the universe. The person then ventures out into the vast ocean of 
spam and penis enlargement ads to look for this mythical creature. 
But then the person has a brilliant idea. She asks herself: How 
about accepting that the projection may or may not correspond to 
reality? Intelligent evil aliens may exist or not, just as crabs, lions, 
and scorpions too might actually exist somewhere in the depths of 
the cosmos. We cannot exclude it. Maybe we could even calculate 
it if we just keep crunching numbers. But how about this question: 
Do intelligent humans exist at all? This person might then discover 
potential samples of this species inside the spacecraft’s own toilet.
It turns out that the intelligent person in the toilet is George 
Michael. And then she realizes that her space travel is not extra- 
terrestrial at all but intraterrestrial. The ExtraSpaceCraft she’s been 
flying never left the launchpad as funding for space missions got 
cut. The cosmos she saw was some sort of projection of U.S. health 
insurance data. Infuriated, she asks George Michael to immediately 
reform police services. He politely points out that policing can be 
seen from a different angle as well: as servicing the community 
of those who keep on being crunched as overpoliced dirty data, 
or ignored as underpoliced inhabitants of all sort of failed states, 
platinum card lounges, and other examples of extraterritorial 
contemporary geographies. Seen from the latter perspective, 
just condemning policing is not going to make things better. Both 
blatant over- and underpolicing combine into the destruction of 
the common.
Let’s leave the detailed description of the different modes of 
servicing the community of flesh and bone to Mr. Michael. But  
from this perspective the sea of data turns out to be the mess of 
human relations (nothing more). Althusser’s model of recognition 
and policing suggests that you need to sacrifice the common like  
20 a haruspex slaughters a sacrificial animal. Next you filter faeces 
from its intestines to predict and master future risk and thus create 
new empires of data barons and stakeholders. It’s a bit rough, 
frankly.
In contrast one could first of all accept that what is portrayed as 
an external and threatening sea of data that needs to be sifted, 
filtered, cleansed, and purified is basically the mess of human 
nature. One might as well have fun with it.
This is not to say that this will be any more rational. It will not be 
more beautiful, noble, or true either. There will be plenty of crabs 
and crap to deal with, not to mention evil humans and intelligent 
aliens. Just ask yourself: do you prefer to dance in an ExtraSpace-
Craft toilet? Or would you rather fill out forms all day?
Notes
 1 “Conspiracy . . . is the poor person’s cognitive mapping in the postmodern age; 
it is a degraded figure of the total logic of late capital, a desperate attempt to 
represent the latter’s system, whose failure is marked by its slippage into sheer 
theme and content” (Jameson 1988, 356). 
 2 I use the word paranoia here to refer to its usage in cultural theory rather than 
in its psychopathological definition. For a different approach, focusing more 
on the symptoms of paranoia (of which apophenia is only one, albeit a very 
important one), see Apprich in this volume.
 3 “The world of finance capital is that perpetual present— but it is not a conti-
nuity; it is a series of singularity- events” (Jameson 2015, 122).
 4 The NSA was spying on World of Warcraft. Seriously.
 5 Spambots are also seen as an example of possible distortion of big- data 
veracity.
 6 “In late June and early July 1991, twelve million people across the country 
(mostly Baltimore, Washington, Pittsburgh, San Francisco, and Los Angeles) lost 
phone service due to a typographical error in the software that controls signals 
regulating telephone traffic. One employee typed a ‘6’ instead of a ‘D.’ The 
phone companies essentially lost all control of their networks.”
 7 My thanks to Ben Bratton for pointing out this fact and to Linda Stupart for 
mentioning apophenia as a term used by William Gibson.
 8 A prosumer is a mix between a producer and a consumer, a consuming pro-
ducer or the other way round.
 9 He clearly states: “The works and customs of mankind do not seem to be very 
suitable material to which to apply scientific induction. A very large part of 
21space- time must be investigated, if reliable results are to be obtained. Oth-
erwise we may (as most English children do) decide that everybody speaks 
English, and that it is silly to learn French” (Turing 1950, 448).
10 Thank you to Linda Stupart for drawing my attention to this notion. For further 
discussion of the concept of apophenia in the context of paranoia, see Apprich 
in this volume.
11 Apophenia is a misextraction, an act of failing interpellation and recognition 
that can have social consequences. As several people pointed out, data can 
also be misunderstood as Dada. Ways of collaging data have characterized 
current popular aesthetics. The creation of improbable combinations and 
the crossing of the limits of the likely can be interpreted as a silent and even 
involuntary act of rebellion against pattern recognition. The manufacturing of 
improbable and implausible objects via all sorts of data manipulation tools is a 
way of confusing automated ways of recognition— face recognition, recognition 
of behavioral patterns, recognition of shapes, and the simultaneous creation of 
categories of political recognition.
12 I wrote this when George Michael was still alive, and I miss him dearly.
13 Thank you to Brian Kuan Wood for pointing this out. 
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Crapularity Hermeneutics: 
Interpretation as the  
Blind Spot of Analytics, 
Artificial Intelligence, 
and Other Algorithmic 
Producers of the 
Postapocalyptic Present 
Florian Cramer
Hermeneutics and Analytics
“Language is easy to capture but difficult to read,” in the words of 
the poet and media researcher John Cayley (Cayley 2012). Cayley 
wrote this sentence merely as a footnote to an essay on his “terms 
of reference,” yet it sums up the whole dilemma of so- called Big 
Data processing. Data “analytics” deals with the same structural 
problem that the oracle priests of Delphi tried to solve: how to 
make sense out of an endless stream of (drug- induced) gibberish? 
Or, as Hito Steyerl noted in the previous chapter— how to trans-
form the garbled noise of women, children, slaves, and foreigners into 
the proper speech of male locals . . . labeled citizens? Even when one 
24 ignores the politics involved, the questions still remain: To what 
degree will the method of interpretation influence the outcome? 
Who gets to choose the method? Which real- world consequences 
will the interpretation have?
Delphi became one of the birthplaces of hermeneutics, the 
theological- philological discipline of exegesis: without expert 
interpretation, first through priests, later through philologists, 
gibberish would have remained gibberish. Literary studies 
secularized hermeneutics in the nineteenth century, and Freud’s 
psychoanalysis— the close reading of the gibberish captured 
from a patient’s subconscious— made it medical and thus applied 
science. Intelligence agencies, investment banks, and internet 
companies turned analysis into analytics.1 In order to quickly make 
sense of captured data, computer analytics had to take shortcuts 
in the process from capturing to reading, by jumping from syntax 
to pragmatics, by operationalizing and thus simplifying semantic 
interpretation in the process.
Computational analytics— whether performed by intelligence 
services, on stock markets, or on web server logs— is limited to 
what can be expressed as quantitative- syntactical operations to be 
performed by algorithms. This conversely changes the perspective  
on the gibberish. Rather than a narrative in need of exegesis, 
it is now a data set in need of statistics. As Johanna Drucker 
pointed out,
the abandonment of interpretation in favor of a naïve 
approach to statistical [analysis] certainly skews the game 
from the outset in favor of a belief that data is intrinsically 
quantitative— self- evident, value neutral, and observer- 
independent. This belief excludes the possibilities of con-
ceiving data as qualitative, co- dependently constituted. 
(Drucker 2011)
Yet it could be argued that data is always qualitative, even when its 
processing is quantitative: this is why algorithms and analytics dis-
25criminate, in the literal as well as in the broader sense of the word, 
whenever they recognize patterns (see Foreword to this volume).
The Politics of Scores
A staple part of Fluxus festivals in the 1960s were Emmett Wil-
liams’s Counting Songs (1962), which consisted of the artists on 
stage counting the audience members one by one. Aside from 
being early pieces of performance art and poetry, minimal music 
and concept art, they also served the pragmatic purpose of obtain-
ing “an exact head count to make sure that the management [of 
the festival venues] wasn’t cheating us” (Williams 1991, 32). With 
the same shortcut from instruction to pragmatics as in today’s 
computer analytics, Williams’s score was thus a simple data- mining 
algorithm. The semantic interpretation of the piece was left to the 
audience, which in the 1960s was likely to have read the piece as 
absurd theater in the tradition of Ionesco and Beckett rather than 
as a musical- poetic performance in the tradition of John Cage’s and 
La Monte Young’s event scores. Today’s audiences might be in-
clined to associate the Counting Songs with the counting of individ-
uals in other confined spaces such as kindergartens, aircrafts, and 
refugee camps. Like other Fluxus pieces, the Counting Songs have 
been commonly read as participatory artworks, since they cannot 
exist by themselves but instead are structurally dependent on their 
audience. Yet they effectively establish and reinforce the various 
divides between the artist- composer, the performers who execute 
the score instructions, and the audience upon whom the score  
is performed. As data processing, the piece thus contains the hi-
erarchy of programmer, program, and data while selling the same 
illusion of participation and interaction with which “interactive 
systems,” from computer games to social networking platforms, 
are being sold today. With their instruction code and performance, 
however, the Counting Songs openly expose this manipulation,  
like a Brechtian theater of algorithm. (The Fluxus artist who most 
consequently worked in the medium of minimalist instruction 
26 scores coincidentally adopted the name George Brecht. Born  
George MacDiarmid, he had previously worked as a chemist  
conducting research and development on tampons at Johnson & 
Johnson.)
On the level of their pragmatics, the Counting Songs may be inter-
preted as an early piece of crisis computing.2 Williams recalls that
sometimes, there were more performers than spectators 
at these “public performances.” And sometimes, when 
the audience outnumbered the performers, the specta-
tors took advantage of the situation. One night, students 
climbed up onto the stage, harried the performers, and 
tried to set fire to the score of my Opera. And once, during 
a performance, in Amsterdam, a girl tried to set Dick Hig-
gins on fire. (1991, 32)
The suspicion that managers tried to cheat the artists proved true, 
since “our share of the gate on the first night of the festival had 
been considerably smaller than the standing- room- only crowd had 
led us to expect” (32). As crisis computing, the Counting Songs thus 
enact the notion of “crisis” in its original Greek meaning (decision) 
as well as in its contemporary sense (state of exception). The songs 
perform decision- making through computing, with the purpose 
of regaining control in a state of exception. However, an inherent 
issue of the Counting Songs is their necessity, as a fixed data- mining 
algorithm for computational analytics, to always anticipate the 
state of exception. They could only react to a crisis scenario that 
the Fluxus artists were already familiar with and that predictably 
repeated itself at each new festival location. But how can a state 
of exception live up to its name when it has become predictable? 
How would the Counting Songs deal, for example, with an overnight 
Brexit in which the Fluxus artists would lose their permit to com-
mercially perform as foreigners? How would the Songs deal with 
a sudden monetary crash that invalidates all cash, leaving people 
only with the possibility to pay for online services through crypto- 
27currencies? How would they deal with nonpaying refugees seeking 
shelter in a festival venue?
The reduction of audience members to countable numbers— 
data sets, indices— is thus a self- fulfilling prophecy of stability. Its 
production of numbers would remain perfectly self- referential, 
even if the counting instructions were riddled with bugs or were 
combined with instructions from others scores (such as, for ex-
ample, Takehisa Kosugi’s Music for a Revolution, which requires the 
performer to “Scoop out one of your eyes 5 years from now and 
do the same with the other eye 5 years later” [Sohm, Szeemann, 
and Kölnischer Kunstverein 1970]) in such a way that would result 
in interferences and unpredictable system behavior. Today, such 
complexity nightmares have become everyday phenomena, from 
computer crashes to Y2K bugs, and in popular fiction such as the 
Robocop character (in Paul Verhoeven’s original 1987 film), whose 
circuits simply shut down when his programmed instructions— to 
arrest criminals— conflict with another programmed instruction 
to never arrest board members of Omni Consumer Products, the 
company that constructed him and that runs Detroit’s privatized 
city administration and police force.
Common wisdom in crisis computing is to increase the complexity 
of algorithms so that systems can cope with the complex realities 
they encounter. The instruction set for Williams’s Counting Songs 
could be extended to also include behavioral rules for Brexit and 
other states of exception, or to cope with a fascist regime under 
which counting people has become the privilege of private warfare 
contractors. What becomes of performance art, with its implicit 
program of disrupting static social situations, when it has to oper-
ate in situations of maximum social disruption? How could a Fluxus 
score be performed in a territory overwhelmed by drone warfare 
or controlled by gangland criminality?
The popular narratives for these scenarios are, of course, not to be 
found in Fluxus. From 2005 to 2010, CBS television broadcast the 
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being applied to solve crimes (Scott and Scott 2005– 2010). The 
show’s two main characters were an FBI agent and his brother, a 
professor of applied mathematics who becomes drawn toward 
police work through his tireless invention of algorithms that predict 
behavioral patterns of crime suspects and the probability of future 
crime scenes. When the show first aired, the term “Big Data” had 
not yet been coined. There were, however, historical precursors to 
algorithmic law enforcement. When the bombings and kidnappings 
of the extreme- left Baader- Meinhof group reached a climax in West 
Germany in 1977, Federal Criminal Police director Horst Herold 
ran population databases through mainframe computers in order 
to narrow down the list of terrorist suspects. The Hamburg- based 
punk band Abwärts (“Downward”) reacted to this in 1980 with their 
song “Computerstaat” (“Computer State”).  It sketches a paranoid- 
apocalyptic present in which Arafat and Brezhnev turn up and 
hang out in the homes of good West German citizens, with the KGB 
invading their forests and sewers, and World War III breaking out 
on their vacation spots. The refrain of the song is:
Germany catastrophe state
We live in the computer state
We live in the computer state
We live in the computer state.3
The LP on which the song was released ends with a sound sample 
of Horst Herold warning Baader- Meinhof members that they would 
eventually crack under the pressure of the police manhunt against 
them. The final statement of his speech, “wir kriegen sie alle”— 
“we’ll get them all”— is pressed into an endlessly repeating lock 
groove on the record. This way, the analog audio medium emulates 
the cybernetic feedback loop of a computerized dragnet search.
Not much seems to have changed between 1977 and 2017 in the 
use of technology and the state of world affairs, if one replaces 
Arafat with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Brezhnev with 
Putin, the KGB with the FSB and perhaps Stalingrad with 9/11. Pre-
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in Philip K. Dick’s 1956 short story Minority Report. The story’s film 
adaption by Steven Spielberg in 2002 featured three- dimensional 
computer interfaces, which likely paved the way for the visual 
aesthetics and mainstream television success of NUMB3RS in 2005. 
On the surface, NUMB3RS might have seemed no more than an up-
dated version of the 1950s radio and television show Dragnet; the 
police method featured in Dragnet, of searching criminals by grad-
ually narrowing down lists of suspects, was itself updated/renewed 
in real life in 1970s Germany using mainframe computers for 
dragnet searches, a method strongly proposed and advocated 
by Horst Herold and reflected in Abwärts’ song Computerstaat. In 
Minority Report, predictive policing was pure science fiction with no 
basis in real technology. But NUMB3RS for the first time presented 
modern computer- based analytics in each of its episodes. The 
formulas, statistics, and algorithms in NUMB3RS were neither old- 
school database searches, nor Hollywood smoke- and- mirrors, but 
genuine mathematics and fairly realistic cases of modern “Big Data” 
analytics. Wolfram Research, the developers of the Mathematica 
software package and the Wolfram Alpha search engine, were 
employed as the show’s scientific consultants to make sure that 
all the mathematics presented in the episodes were real and that 
the algorithms and visualization could work. The producers of the 
series were the brothers Ridley and Tony Scott, whose feature films 
Black Hawk Down (2001) and Top Gun (1985) were about modern 
warfare and had been produced with direct support from the U.S. 
Army (and in the case of Top Gun, also with financial support from 
the U.S. Department of Defense); conversely, Tony Scott’s 1998 film 
Enemy of the State presented a dystopic, technologically realistic 
scenario of NSA communication surveillance.
Whether or not NUMB3RS should be read as an early 2000s 
military- industrial sales pitch for 2010s Big Data and predictive po-
licing technology, the analytics of each episode lends itself perfectly 
to critical review by civil rights activists as well as digital humanities 
scholars. Today, it is a widely reported fact that data sets and 
30 algorithms, or the combination of both, can and do discriminate. 
In 2016, an op- ed piece in the New York Times called for the need 
to “Make Algorithms Accountable” in relation to algorithmically 
computed “risk scores” for creditors and prospective criminals  
(Angwin 2016). In an article for the same newspaper, Kate Craw-
ford, a professor at NYU and founder of the AI Institute, referred to 
this as “A.I.’s [= artificial intelligence’s] White Guy Problem”:
Sexism, racism and other forms of discrimination are 
being built into the machine - learning algorithms that 
underlie the technology behind many “intelligent” systems 
that shape how we are categorized and advertised to.
Take a small example from last year: Users discovered 
that Google’s photo app, which applies automatic labels 
to pictures in digital photo albums, was classifying imag-
es of black people as gorillas. Google apologized; it was 
unintentional.
But similar errors have emerged in Nikon’s camera 
software, which misread images of Asian people as blink-
ing, and in Hewlett Packard’s web camera software, which 
had difficulty recognizing people with dark skin tones. 
(Crawford 2016)
Crawford also mentions predictive policing as problematic, since 
“software analyses of large sets of historical crime data are used 
to forecast where crime hot spots are most likely to emerge,” thus 
“perpetuating an already vicious cycle” with “more surveillance 
in traditionally poorer, nonwhite neighborhoods, while wealthy, 
whiter neighborhoods are scrutinized even less.”4
When in 2005 the pilot episode of NUMB3RS featured crime hotspot 
mapping through mathematical formulas implemented into com-
puter algorithms, this was presented as the convergence of police 
work and clean- room lab science. The reality of the technology, 
however, is not quite as spotless. In 2016, the American nonprofit 
investigative journalism platform ProPublica found that “there’s 
software used across the country to predict future criminals. 
31And it’s biased against blacks” (Angwin et al. 2016). Surveying the 
algorithmically computed “risk scores” of more than 7,000 people 
arrested in Broward County, Florida, in 2013 and 2014, ProPublica 
concluded that the “score proved remarkably unreliable in 
forecasting violent crime: Only 20 percent of the people predicted 
to commit violent crimes actually went on to do so.” The algorithm 
“was particularly likely to falsely flag black defendants as future 
criminals, wrongly labeling them this way at almost twice the rate 
as white defendants. . . . White defendants were mislabeled as 
low risk more often than black defendants” (Angwin et al. 2016). 
Furthermore, the algorithm that assessed the risk score was not 
developed by the police or by any other government agency, nor 
was it published; rather, it was developed and kept as a trade 
secret by the private company Northpointe (a subsidiary of the 
Canadian Volaris Group), whose stated mission is “to improve 
correctional decision making at the level of individual offender  
case decisions, and at the level of system- wide policy, planning,  
and program evaluation” (Northpointe 2016).
In practice, predictive policing programs extend to a principle of 
tightly policing neighborhoods identified through analytics as crime 
hotspots. In 2014, a spokesperson for the American Civil Liberties 
Union called this principle “guilt by association”: “Because you live 
in a certain neighborhood or hang out with certain people, we are 
now going to be suspicious of you and treat you differently, not 
because you have committed a crime or because we have informa-
tion that allows us to arrest you, but because our predictive tool 
shows us you might commit a crime at some point in the future” 
(Eligon and Williams 2015).
Positivism Dispute Redux
The MIT Technology Review, a periodical whose overall perspective 
on technology tends to be optimistic and trustful, published in 
2016 an article on how artificial intelligence analytics “Reveals the 
Hidden Sexism of Language” (arXiv 2016). A neural network trained 
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the question “father : doctor :: mother : x” with “x = nurse” and 
“man : computer programmer :: woman : x” with “x = homemaker.” 
(arXiv 2016). The problem is not only in the semantic bias of the 
data set, but also in the design of the algorithm that treats the data 
as unbiased fact, and finally in the users of the computer program 
who believe in its scientific objectivity.
The issue of discrimination and even killings of people based on 
hidden biases in computing is nothing new. The 1982 book The 
Network Revolution by the computer scientist Jacques Vallee begins 
with the following account:
On Friday, 9 November 1979, at 10 p.m., three young 
men driving on Highway 20 stopped at a gas station in 
Etampes, near Paris. . . . Mr. Nicolas, the service station 
operator, took a dim view of the tattered blue jeans, the 
leather jackets, the license number which did not look 
right because it was patched up with bits of black tape. . . . 
Nicolas . . . called the police to report the “suspicious” car 
and its even more disreputable occupants. In Etampes, 
police officers went to the computer terminal linking them 
with the central file of the Interior Ministry, in Paris, a file 
whose very existence had recently been denied by a Cab-
inet member. In response to a brief flurry of commands, 
the police entered the car’s license number into the com-
puter’s memory for checking against its data bank. The 
system soon flashed its verdict: the vehicle was stolen. . . . 
A special night brigade was dispatched. The white and 
black police Renault intercepted the Peugeot driven by 
Francois at a red light. . . . The only police officer in uni-
form stayed inside the Renault: the other two, in civilian 
clothes, got out. One of them covered the Peugeot with 
his machine gun at the ready. The other stood in front of 
the suspect’s car and armed his .357 Magnum. . . . A mo-
ment later, a shot rang out. The bullet went through the 
windshield and hit Claude’s face just under the nose. . . . 
33Subsequent investigation disclosed that the car belonged 
to Francois, who had bought it, legally, ten days before. 
It had indeed been stolen in 1976, but it was soon re-
covered by the insurance company, which sold it to the 
garage where Francois bought it. The computer file had 
never been updated to reflect the change in the status of 
the car. The central police records still regarded it as sto-
len property.5 (Vallee 1982, 3– 4)
Compared with 1970s and 1980s database dragnets, contemporary 
Big Data analytics have only become more speculative, since their 
focus is no longer on drawing conclusions for the present from the 
past but on guessing the future, and since they no longer target 
people based on the fact that their data matches other database 
records but instead based on more speculative statistical proba-
bilities of environmental factors and behavioral patterns. Whether 
or not human- created (and hence human- tainted) data is to be 
blamed for discrimination, or for the hidden assumptions hard- 
coded into algorithms that are employed for processing this data— 
or whether machine- generated data can even be biased— they 
all confirm Cayley’s observation that language is “easy to capture 
but difficult to read,” that each operation of automated analytics 
involves shortcuts from capturing to execution, from syntax to 
pragmatics, leaving behind semantics and thorough critical inter-
pretation as their collateral damage. This is as much illustrated by 
the news story mentioned above as by each episode of NUMB3Rs, 
which in forty- five minutes covers, besides a crime and its reso-
lution, the finding of a mathematical model for a particular crime 
and the translation of that model into an algorithm and computer 
program (alongside such trivia as the brothers’ conflicts with each 
other and with their father, and one of the brother’s relationship 
with his grad student).
Critical discussions of data analytics, such as in the present 
publication, inevitably reenact the positivism dispute of 1960s 
continental European social sciences.6 Its two main adversaries 
were the Frankfurt School with its orientation toward hermeneutic 
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methodological orientation of social and natural sciences towards 
problem solving (Popper 1962, 3). Popper, however, still distanced 
his position from pure quantitative science by insisting that 
“insight neither begins with perceptions or observations, nor with 
collection of data or facts, but it departs from problems”7 (Popper 
1962, 2). In light of this dispute, the twenty- first- century shift from 
interpretation towards analytics, and from problems towards data, 
amounts to a much more radical positivism than either Adorno or 
Popper imagined. Arguing against Popper and empirical sociology, 
Habermas stated in 1963 that
the analytical- empirical modes of procedure tolerate only 
one type of experience which they themselves define. 
Only the controlled observation of physical behaviour, 
which is set up in an isolated field under reproducible 
conditions by subjects interchangeable at will, seems to 
permit intersubjectively valid judgments of perception. 
(Habermas 1976, 134)
From this perspective, the issues that Crawford and others ob-
served in Big Data and artificial intelligence analytics are not  
limited to biases and skewed parameters within empirical “con-
trolled observation”— for which the authors of the MIT Technology 
Review article propose, in all seriousness, a de- skewing algorithm 
(arXiv 2016). Rather, the bias lies in the setup as such, the “experi-
ence which they themselves define” (to again quote Habermas), 
which therefore involves a priori choices and decisions as well 
as unacknowledged biases. Interpretation hence constitutes the 
setup, while at the same time being disclaimed by the analysts. 
Hermeneutics, in other words, is always at work in analytics, 
though it is rarely acknowledged as such. The art theoretician  
Boris Groys identifies the internet corporations’ business model  
of collecting their users’ personal information— including  
“interests, desires, and needs”— as a “monetization of classical 
hermeneutics” in which “hermeneutic value” becomes a “surplus 
value” (Groys 2016, 179– 80). Groys effectively blends the Frankfurt 
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critique of positivism, reflecting the early twenty- first- century  
status quo in which Silicon Valley has replaced Hollywood as the 
epitome of creative industries, with analytics of user- generated 
content rather than content production as its (multibillion dollar) 
business model.
Since an objective analytics, devoid of any interpretation and 
thus of any bias, does not exist, hermeneutics creeps in through 
the back door of analytics. This already begins at the point 
where data is captured, since almost any type of data acquisition 
requires subjective decision making (for example, concerning 
digital representation of color in scanned images).8 Such technical- 
operational decisions become political when, for example, they 
concern accuracy of skin- tone reproduction, a problem that is not 
new but already existed in the days of analog film when filmmakers 
(including Jean- Luc Godard) boycotted Kodak due to the company’s 
color and dynamic range calibration of film stocks, which was opti-
mized for the reproduction of white skin and left black actors’ faces 
underexposed.9 In addition, data acquisition introduces its own 
artifacts— such as lens and microphone distortion, video and audio 
noise— whose retroactive filtering requires interpretative, often 
aesthetic decisions. Operators are interpreters. Though interpreta-
tion of data— or interpretation of sheet music by a musician— may 
be more confined than, for example, the interpretative reading of a 
novel, they are structurally no less hermeneutic.
From capturing to reading data, interpretation and hermeneutics 
thus creep into all levels of analytics. Biases and discrimination are 
only the extreme cases that make this mechanism most clearly visi-
ble. Interpretation thus becomes a bug, a perceived system failure, 
rather than a feature or virtue. As such, it exposes the fragility and 
vulnerabilities of data analytics. Analytics and hermeneutics thus 
relate to each other like the visible front end and the invisible back 
door in a piece of software, i.e. the kind of “backdoors” that remote 
attackers can exploit in order to gain control of a system. The “Hey 
you” with which the policeman talked George Michael into his 
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level of analytics, it is the primordial act of recognition and control 
described in the previous chapter. On the level of George Michael’s 
hermeneutics, it was an erotic proposal; yet for the policeman, 
it was a disciplinary speech act that tactically encouraged erotic 
hermeneutics in order to be, in the end, all the more powerful as a 
disciplinary device.
Thus, hermeneutics becomes a backdoor practice in a libidinous 
sense. Not only does any network interface, as Chun pointed out, 
“act promiscuously” and does the internet leak by design (Chun 
2016, 51), the fact that this promiscuity occurs on the level of 
technical automation (of network hardware as well as software) 
conversely obscures interpretative agency, including by intelligence 
and law enforcement agencies and intellectual property law firms 
that intercept and judicially interpret the network communications 
of surveilled individuals. Since this promiscuity does not happen on 
the front ends but on the back ends, through the backdoors and 
sometimes in the darkrooms of the internet, it is clandestine pro-
miscuity and stigmatized hermeneutics; its practitioners will rarely 
come out of the closet the way Edward Snowden did. Historically, 
there may never have been as much interpretation going on as 
there is in the age of analytics, yet this paradoxically coincides with 
a blindness for the subjective viewpoints involved.
Drucker, too, insists on the crucial role of interpretation in the 
analysis (and visualization) of data, except that she is more optimis-
tic regarding the necessity— rather than some backdoor repressed 
expression— of the humanities perspective. She argues that the
natural world and its cultural corollary exist, but the 
humanistic concept of knowledge depends upon the 
interplay between a situated and circumstantial viewer 
and the objects or experiences under examination and 
interpretation. That is the basic definition of humanistic 
knowledge, and its graphical display must be specific 
to this definition in its very foundational principles. The 
challenge is enormous, but essential, if the humanistic 
37worldview, grounded in the recognition of the interpre-
tative nature of knowledge, is to be part of the graphical 
expressions that come into play in the digital environ-
ment. (Drucker 2011)
The paradox of Big Data is that it both affirms and denies this 
“interpretative nature of knowledge.” Just like the Oracle of Delphi, 
it is dependent on interpretation. But unlike the oracle priests, 
its interpretative capability is limited by algorithmics— so that the 
limitations of the tool (and, ultimately, of using mathematics to pro-
cess meaning) end up defining the limits of interpretation. Similarly 
to Habermas, Drucker sees the danger of “ceding the territory of 
interpretation to the ruling authority of certainty established on the 
false claims of observer- independent objectivity” (Drucker 2011). 
This relates to her example of the visual perspective in which the 
graph of an epidemic is drawn, just as much as the interpretation 
of criminological data in alleged “hotspot” neighborhoods.
The territory of interpretation thus becomes a battleground 
between quantitative analytics and critical theory. In the latter, 
the mode of operation is always hermeneutic in the broad sense 
of being interpretative, discursive, and not privileging quantitative 
methodology, regardless of whether this methodology sails under 
hermeneutic, structuralist or materialist, humanist or posthuman-
ist flags, and regardless of the debates between these schools. The 
question as to whether there is any qualitative difference between 
analytics and interpretation ultimately addresses the viability 
of artificial intelligence. If analytics can, hypothetically, render 
interpretation obsolete, then algorithms should ultimately be able 
to replace most sociologists, critics, and humanities scholars— or, 
at least, to render obsolete their hands- on interpretative work and 
shift their profession toward research and development of data 
analytics algorithms.
The Crapularity Is Here
Leaving aside all philosophical debates on artificial intelligence, 
current Big Data applications show that the viability of A.I. is not so 
38 much an epistemological issue but rather one of pure pragmatics. 
Whether or not A.I., or some types of A.I., are fundamentally flawed 
and unfit for their purpose, they nevertheless will be developed 
and used when they seem to get things done and when they 
deliver, most importantly, quantifiable results such as a decrease 
in crime statistics (no matter the social and political side effects), as 
well as cutting labor costs.
To put it in the words of one of A.I.’s most popular evangelists: The 
Singularity Is Near (Kurzweil 2005). But if the “singularity” is indeed 
near, this is not because machines or algorithms are becoming 
more intelligent (or just smarter, which is not the same thing). As 
shown in the previous chapter, “the markets” are the living proof 
that these machines or algorithms are no prerequisite for a “sin-
gularity” (see Steyerl in this volume). In this sense, the “singularity” 
has been around since at least the eighteenth century. According to 
Adam Smith’s theory of the “invisible hand,” the greed of individual 
economic actions does not matter since they neutralize each 
other’s stupidity and thus together amount to an intelligent system.
The contemporary version of the “singularity” lacks such optimism 
because it will ultimately require society to dumb itself down. 
Machine utopias and dystopias would simply not be feasible 
otherwise, because the difficulties of making sense of information 
that is so easy to capture will still remain. As a countermeasure, 
culture and society must thus make themselves perfectly computer 
readable. When autonomous cars cause lethal highway accidents 
because their computer vision mistakes a white truck for a street 
sign— which is what happened to the A.I. autopilot of a Tesla car 
on May 7, 2016, in Williston, Florida— then this almost exactly 
fulfills the “Don’t Drive Evil- ularity” scenario sketched in 2011 by the 
Postnormal Times researcher John A. Sweeney:
Crash of Google- controlled robot car drives S&P to lower 
credit rating of USA, sending car loan rates and insurance 
premiums through the roof. Police suspect robot was 
watching Transcendent Man while driving. (Raford, Swee-
ney, and Pickard 2011)
39In the case of crashed Tesla car, it was actually the human driver 
who was watching a Harry Potter movie (Levin and Woolf 2016). 
The long- term solution is not to improve the pattern recognition 
algorithms of cars, an endeavor as prone to overcomplexity and 
systemic failure as the extension of the Fluxus Counting Songs to 
crisis and catastrophe scenarios. Instead, all cars and highways 
could be redesigned and rebuilt in such a way as to make them 
failure- proof for computer vision and autopilots. For example, by 
painting all cars in the same specific colors, and with computer- 
readable barcode identifiers on all four sides, designing their 
bodies within tightly predefined shape parameters to eliminate the 
risk of confusion with other objects, by redesigning all road signs 
with QR codes and OCR- readable characters, by including built- in 
redundancies to eliminate misreading risks for computer vision 
systems, by straightening motorways to make them perfectly linear 
and moving cities to fit them, and by redesigning and rebuilding all 
cities to make them safe for inner- city autonomous car traffic.10 In 
addition, all buildings— residences, offices, factories, hotels, sta-
tions, airports— could be redesigned so they can be fully serviced 
(cleaned, maintained, and front desk– clerked) by robots; a much 
more realistic scenario than speculating on breakthroughs in artifi-
cial intelligence systems such as computer vision and robotics that 
would, sometime in the future, make robots fit for servicing exist-
ing buildings. (This scenario has countless precursors in popular 
science fiction, including, for example, Stuart Gordon’s 1996 movie 
Space Truckers, in which the protagonists transport square pigs 
that have been genetically modified to make more efficient use of 
limited spaceship cargo capacity. [Gordon 1997].)
Instead, “legacy” buildings that cannot be easily serviced by robots 
would likely become a surcharge luxury of the rich who can still 
afford human services. The singularity scenario would further 
entail, for example, a redesign of all education as automated online 
courses with computerized tests and certificates, leaving brick- 
and- mortar schools only for those who still can afford the higher 
tuition. The “social credit” system that China announced for its 
citizens in 2015, could become a worldwide model: each person’s 
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supposed social productivity (in China: support of Communist 
Party politics), with access to— for instance— higher education and 
mortgage loans becoming dependent on a good credit score (Hat-
ton 2015). Globally implemented, all automata that provide ser-
vices or goods could accept “social credit” as payment so that this 
system could eventually replace traditional currencies. The “sharing 
economies” that are now provided by companies such as Uber and 
Airbnb could be scaled up to make them all- pervasive, allowing one 
to rent out all of one’s belongings, even for the shortest periods of 
nonuse, as well as potential labor services. This would not so much 
be a means to generate surplus income but rather a socioecologi-
cal austerity measure and necessity for everyone (except the rich) 
to make ends meet. Such systems could, after all, be introduced by 
liberal politicians as ostensible measures against nationalist, racist, 
and fascist backlashes in public opinion, promising liberal voters to 
fight prejudice and class or race privilege with a universal meritoc-
racy based on objective (and thus fair) quantitative measurements.
The “singularity” described above could be achieved using today’s 
technology. It would not even require any further fundamental 
research in the field of machine cognition, or any algorithms 
and chips that do not yet exist. Software and hardware research 
could even be stopped in order to yield the additional benefit of 
standardization based on a few optimized machine designs mass- 
produced at lower cost, which would conversely allow for a greater 
number of chips to be included in everyday devices.
In his contribution to a 2011 collaborative document on Alternatives 
to the Singularity, the technology anthropologist Justin Pickard charac-
terized the corresponding present state of affairs as the “crapularity”:
3D printing + spam + micropayments = tribbles that you 
get billed for, as it replicates wildly out of control. 90% of 
everything is rubbish, and it’s all in your spare room— or 
someone else’s spare room, which you’re forced to rent 
through AirBnB. (Raford, Sweeney, and Pickard 2011)
41The degree to which this dystopia has become our present- day 
reality can be monitored through the popular Twitter feed “Internet 
of Shit,” which currently has 213,000 subscribers. (“Internet of Shit” 
2015) Under the motto “The Internet of Shitty Things is here. Have 
all of your best home appliances ruined by putting the internet 
in them!” the microblog publishes— for example— Windows “blue 
screens of death” in elevators, ransomware messages on train sta-
tion displays, and a car performing a software update on its central 
computer console while it is being driven (Kawaguchi 2016).
Compared to the artificial intelligence systems that see faeces in 
clouds, the “Internet of Shit” is a more atavistic version of the crab 
in, crap out principle described in the previous chapter (Steyerl in 
this volume), since it is only about the endless multiplication of 
dumb and wasteful electronic gadgets. But whether crapularity or 
singularity, the differentiation of systems into such subcategories 
as “internet,” “artificial intelligence,” “machine vision” and “pattern 
recognition,” “Big Data,” “smart cities,” and “internet of things” 
will likely soon become a thing of the past. These systems are 
converging in the same way in which Hans Magnus Enzensberger, 
in 1970, predicted the convergence of communication media— 
“news satellites, color television, cable relay television, cassettes, 
videotape, videotape recorders, video- phones, stereophony, laser 
techniques, electrostatic reproduction processes, electronic high- 
speed printing, composing and learning machines, microfiches 
with electronic access, printing by radio, time- sharing computers, 
data banks”— into “a universal system” (Enzensberger 2003, 261). 
What sounded monumental then has now become banal, as could 
eventually be the case with the future convergence of analytics 
systems. Besides rendering obsolete such differentiations as those 
between Big Data, A.I., and smart cities, it is also likely to render 
obsolete the term “media” itself. The issue that information ceases 
to be a “difference which makes a difference” (Bateson 1972, 459) 
within technology is as old as McLuhan’s definition of media as 
“extensions of man,” (McLuhan 1964), which lacks any meaningful 
differentiation between “media” and other types of technology.
42 Fluxus showed, in 1962, how social network analytics and “social 
credit” can be computed using almost any technology, including 
the cheapest computational device of manual counting. In a 2004 
interview with the curator Hans- Ulrich Obrist, Emmett Williams 
recalled how the artists disguised their control device as a friendly 
game. Counting audience members, Williams explains, meant that 
“you could touch them; you could have them write their names on 
the program, put a candy in everybody’s mouth. This way you had 
contact with the audience and at the same time could work out 
exactly how many people were there and demand our fair share of 
the money” (Obrist, Arsène- Henry, and Shumon Basar 2010, n.p.). 
Contemporary design calls this “gamification,” and it has become 
a widely practiced method for creating “soft” or “nudging” control 
measures in public and private spaces.11
A Fluxus score written a year before the first Fluxus festival, La 
Monte Young’s Compositions 1961 consisted only of the instruction 
to “Draw a straight line and follow it,” (Young 1962) thus anticipat-
ing the singularity of a society whose architectures and processes 
have been streamlined and simplified, even “zombified,” in order 
to be fully readable and serviceable by dumb bots. If machine- 
readability and human- readability, capture and analytics (as 
opposed to perception and interpretation), mark the difference be-
tween the “humanistic concept of knowledge” (Drucker 2011) and 
A.I., then this difference reveals a fundamental problem of A.I.: its 
very concept is, to use a term from speculative realist philosophy, 
correlationist, since the word artificial dialectically references natu-
ral. The quality standard for A.I., and the “singularity” as predicted 
by its advocates, is how convincingly it measures up against natural 
(i.e., human, partly also animal) intelligence.
Since there is no firm definition or universally agreed- upon 
scientific theory of “intelligence,” one could just as well define 
intelligence as the capability to perform mathematical equations. 
Then, the singularity would already have been reached with pocket 
calculators, or even with some mechanical entrance- gate device 
that would had counted Fluxus festival visitors more efficiently 
43than the Counting Songs did.12 The Faroese musician and artist 
Goodiepal, who from 2004 to 2008 taught his students at the 
Danish Institute for Electroacoustic Music (DIEM) to compose music 
for alien and artificial intelligences,13 therefore proposes to read A.I. 
not as an acronym for “artificial” but for “alternative intelligence.” 
If machine intelligence is indeed a different form of intelligence, 
then it can be observed and judged on the basis of its own merits, 
as opposed to a messianic waiting for a moment where it might 
equal or eclipse (weakly defined) human intelligence. This would 
even render obsolete the question as to whether or not machines 
can think— which in itself willfully glosses over the corresponding 
opposite question, “Can humans think?” posed by the former 
Fluxus artist (and Emmett Williams collaborator) Tomas Schmit in 
the year 2000 (Schmit et al. 2007, 18– 19).
The singularity is here, whether in counting songs, pocket cal-
culators, or more sophisticated computational devices. But it is 
doomed to be a crapularity as these systems are increasingly 
layered on top of each other and kept running without mainte-
nance, often even without anybody around who still knows how 
they work. This crappiness (which includes crappy Big Data “ana-
lytics”) could be celebrated and enjoyed like other crappy culture, 
including television shows such as NUMB3RS and B movies such 
as Space Truckers. The problem, however, is that the crapularity is 
not a movie but has become daily life and that its worst jokes are 
actually deadly.
Negative Theologies of the Subject
While A.I. has become “alternative intelligence,” the critical theory 
that Habermas defended against empirical positivism no longer 
seems to embody the human “alternative intelligence” that it was 
in the twentieth century. Why, Hito Steyerl asked the author of 
the present text, can one analyze fascism all day long and no one 
cares?14 No one cares, it should be added, whether such analysis 
happens under Marxist or post- Marxist, feminist, postcolonial, 
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ontological, media- theoretical, speculative- realist, humanist or 
posthumanist denominations, since positivism boils all of these 
down to one undifferentiated “continental,” “nonempirical” and 
“speculative” discourse.
In the crapularity, “subjectivity” gains a renewed significance as 
soon as this subjectivity is no longer an issue of metaphysical 
versus ontological thinking but more generally of criticism 
versus positivism. With her insistence on the “graphical expression 
of humanistic interpretation” as distinct from “the visual display 
of quantitative information as a close reading of a poem is from 
the chart of an eye tracker following movements across a printed 
page,” Drucker (2011) shows how the word humanistic can be sal-
vaged even for those kinds of cultural and media studies that have 
been thoroughly informed by poststructuralism and subsequent 
schools of antimetaphysical thinking.
Before the crapularity, any inclusion of “subjectivity” in “terms of 
media”— or more precisely, in information technology— seemed 
to be an oxymoron, since rejection (or at least criticism) of the 
humanist subject has been a common denominator of cybernetics, 
poststructuralism, and most schools of materialism and feminism 
(Braidotti 2013). The focus of media theory on technologies, 
rather than on their human creators, may in itself be seen as 
an antihumanist statement. Terry Eagleton’s characterization of 
structuralism thus broadly applies to most media theory: it “is 
‘anti- humanist,’ which means not that its devotees rob children 
of their sweets but that they reject the myth that meaning begins 
and ends in the individual’s ‘experience’ ” (Eagleton 1996, 98). This 
intellectual tradition began with Darwin’s and Freud’s shattering 
of the subject’s autonomy and continued after the Second World 
War with cybernetics. In its close relatedness to psychological 
behaviorism, cybernetics understood human behavior as situated 
within control systems. In 1946, Heidegger— who was in the 
process of “turning”15 his fundamental ontology into a philosophy 
of technology— stated that “every humanism remains metaphysi-
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itself.16 What was primarily meant as clarification of Heidegger’s 
philosophy in opposition to Sartre and his humanist misreading 
of Heidegger’s existential philosophy17 had a lasting impact on 
French poststructuralism and the media theory that subsequently 
borrowed from it.
When Michel Foucault declared the “death of man” in Order of 
Things (1966),18 the death of God did not mean, as it did for human-
ism, his replacement by the human subject, but rather the death 
of the Christian god as well as of the humanist god- like subject. 
Kittler’s lifelong “exorcism of humanism from the humanities,” in 
which technology took the place of the historical subject, built upon 
Foucault while battling the remains of nineteenth- century idealism 
in continental European humanities (Kittler 1980). Antihumanism 
became posthumanism when poststructuralist dystopias turned 
into cyber- utopias. Donna Haraway’s Cyborg Manifesto and 
N. Katherine Hayles’s How We Became Posthuman examined A.I.  
and Silicon Valley culture from the angle of critical theory. Posthu-
manism turned what once had been negative theology into new 
utopias and new forms of gnosis.19 Contemporary critiques of 
correlationism (Meillassoux 2009) and debates on the Anthropo-
cene amount to a contemporary comeback of posthumanism, with 
a systems thinking that has shifted from 1990s cyber- utopias to 
twenty- first- century ecological dystopias (Braidotti 2013).
Did the antitheologies of “the subject” simply create new theologies 
of “the system”? The poststructuralist critique of subjectivity was 
more differentiated than it is often given credit for. In What Is an 
Author? Michel Foucault states that “suspicions arise concerning 
the absolute nature and creative role of the subject” while also 
insisting that “the subject should not be entirely abandoned. It 
should be reconsidered, not to restore the theme of an originating 
subject, but to seize its functions, its intervention in discourse, and 
its system of dependencies” (Foucault 2001, 1635). Subjectivity, in 
other words, is relative rather than absolute (as was previously the 
case in humanism and romanticism).20
46 The inscription of subjectivity into media— of perspective and 
pictures, whether or not machine vision is involved— needs no 
explanation when algorithmic processes produce racial, social, and 
other biases. Most engineers might consider these an optimization 
problem, an issue of the platonic ideal of singularity versus its crap-
ularity in real life. Yet everyone who has ever coded a computer 
program, programmed a database, or marked up a document 
knows that this constantly involves subjective decisions:21 for 
example, the criteria according to which input data is classified, 
sorted, and categorized, including the multiple- choice values for a 
person’s gender in an address database, or the interpretation of 
italic type as either “emphasis” (“<em>”) or “citation” (“<cite>”) when 
transcribing text from print to HTML. No algorithmic analytics can 
sensibly accomplish the latter; it will only be able to compute and 
heuristically apply the statistical norm. “If you want a vision of the 
future, imagine the past (artificially) extended forever”— this line 
from the 1986 zine SMILE (which had the unusual characteristic 
that anyone could publish a zine under the name SMILE), written 
by the artist and later internet entrepreneur John Berndt under the 
multiple- use pseudonym Karen Eliot, is an precognitive summary 
of the crapularity and its analytics (Eliot 2010).
However, programmed systems also help to define more precisely 
what exactly differentiates “semantics” from “syntax” and interpre-
tation from formal analysis. They thus bring to hermeneutics and 
structuralism, which only had vague definitions of these terms, an 
understanding of what these words really mean. Figures of speech, 
for example, can now be clearly understood as being subject to an 
interpretation that is difficult or impossible to formalize. Ambiguity 
and figurative speech mark the limits of what computer algorithms 
can analyze. Are Abwärts’s “Computerstaat” lyrics an affirmative, 
oppositional, or cynical political statement? Even A.I. algorithms 
that determine the degree to which a statement is ironic based on 
semantic context would be thrown off track.22
Twentieth- century structuralists such as Roman Jakobson still 
thought of figures of speech as a formal aspect of language, since 
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could be understood as a linguistic operation based on the 
principle of similarity (Jakobson 1956). Metaphor was classified as 
“formal” because it could be made part of a systematics. Jakobson, 
and later twentieth- century antihumanism, thus maintained 
the romanticist notion of “subjectivity” as being antithetical to 
systems, discourses, and apparatuses. In the crapularity, however, 
subjectivity needs to be deromanticized. It can be simply defined 
as the agency and decisions— in other words, politics— that make 
up these systems, discourses, and apparatuses. To deny that these 
politics exist would be an extremist, if not fascist, form of posthu-
manism advocating postpolitics and postdemocracy (Crouch 2004).
The Invisible Hand of Openness
If the Fluxus Counting Songs were performed by a machine, running 
forever as an autonomous, unobserved process, this wouldn’t take 
away the human agency and politics that went into their design. 
But their potential automation illustrates, perhaps counterintui-
tively, the degree to which they are an open process— or, to use 
Umberto Eco’s term, an “open work” characterized by an internal 
“dialectics between work and openness” (Eco 1989, 104). For Eco, 
this dialectic is one of the traditional material characteristics of 
an artwork, which it still retains in order to remain dialectical, as 
opposed to its modern- art processuality, for example in action 
painting (102). In the case of the Counting Songs, this would be its 
dialectics between (fixed) notation and (open) performance. Yet, 
as previously discussed, the closure (in the sense of nonopenness) 
of the Counting Songs lies in its implicit assumptions about the 
situation— the kind of closure that would make a crapularity bot 
stoically perform the Counting Songs in a heap of postnuclear 
ruins, counting people while they are being shot dead by drones, 
rendering the sum outdated even as it is being computed. Pattern 
discrimination as it is applied in data and network analytics suffers 
from this issue, since it boils down to applying predefined models 
to an alleged mass— and mess— of contingent phenomena and 
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be airport surveillance camera images, petabytes of intercepted 
emails, the sensor data of a “smart city,” or the visitors of a Fluxus 
festival.
But whatever the type of analytics or interpretation involved, these 
necessarily rely on operation upon “the open,” even if these “great 
outdoors”23 are increasingly difficult to find (see Steyerl in this 
volume); and regardless of the fact that the analytics in question 
are limited to seeing only what the search and correlation methods 
will tell them to see— not to mention the risk of a crapularity bot 
data- mining minefields even as they are blowing up. “Openness” is 
where analytics and hermeneutics meet: “open data,” the sibling of 
Big Data, and “open work” both imply an antischolastics of rejecting 
precategorized and prehierarchized knowledge. When hermeneu-
tics was still a theological discipline, its mere existence implied that 
the meaning of the scripture (whether Torah, Bible, or Qur’an) was 
not literal and fixed, as the orthodoxies and fundamentalisms of 
the monotheistic religions hold, but rather subject to interpretation 
and, over the course of time, reinterpretation. This process not 
only secularized scripture but also hermeneutics itself so that, 
by the nineteenth century, it had mutated into literary criticism 
(Schleiermacher 1998).
In the 1960s and 1970s, Eco was not the only literary theoretician 
to modernize hermeneutics and literary criticism, and to make 
“openness” (in the sense of open work as well as open inter-
pretation) the key factor in this modernization. Roland Barthes 
advocated the “networks” and “galaxy of signifiers” in the “inde-
terminable” codes of the “writerly” text (Barthes 1974, 5), while 
Wolfgang Iser and Hans- Robert Jauss (building on previous work 
by Roman Ingarden) proposed a reader- response hermeneutics 
that focused on the gaps that artworks leave for their readers’ 
imagination (Iser 1978). While these theories only addressed the 
aesthetics— perception— rather than the media technology of 
text, they were nevertheless misread as technology blueprints in 
the hypertext literature criticism that to some extent preceded, 
49and further accompanied the emergence of the World Wide Web 
in the early 1990s.24 Around the same time, activism to make and 
keep the internet an “open” medium began in grassroots initiatives 
such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation. By the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, the concept of openness was extended to software 
(open source) and other media (open content), as well as academic 
publishing (open access) and data (open data).
From Eco’s Open Work in 1962 to the Open Government Data 
definition in 2007 (Fretwell 2014), “open” thus always meant “good” 
or at least “more interesting.” Openness provides more value for 
interpretation, whether for literary philologists or real- estate app 
developers using open government data to assess the potential 
market value of a neighborhood. For philologists as well as app 
developers, interpretative value translates into economic value as 
it helps keep them in business. (In this light, claims of the imminent 
“end of work” seem exaggerated.25) Both “open work” hermeneu-
tics and open data analytics presuppose a culture and society that 
enables them while preventing closure (nonopenness) through 
orthodoxy. They are thus close cousins to Popper’s general concept 
of the “open society” (Popper 1945). Projected from science onto 
politics, Popper’s principle of falsification turns this open society 
into a market of competing ideas that are given the opportunity to 
prove each other wrong. On a dystopian level, this also creates a 
business model for the age of crapularity. Since falsification never 
ends (as opposed to Hegel’s and Marx’s historical dialectics), it 
amounts to an infinite license for the crapularity to carry on with 
crap analytics, crap results, and crappy technology, keeping culture 
and society in a state of permanent system updates, error mes-
sages, and software- dependency hells where doors stop working 
because their remote control apps are no longer being maintained 
and where two bugs are fixed by introducing ten new ones.26
Popper’s open society, however, is not radically open since it still 
differentiates between itself and “its enemies”: fascism, soviet 
communism, and their alleged precursors in political- philosophical 
utopias. If “open societies” need enemies in order to be defined, 
50 it is not surprising that nowadays these enemies include the 
extraterritorial enclaves and duty- free gated communities, para- 
statelets and anti- “terrorist” operation zones, offshore entities and 
corporate proxy concessions described in the previous chapter 
(Steyerl in this volume).
The “open society” is, in other words, only open to the degree to 
which its fundamental system is not challenged. Openness thus 
only exists on the object level of what is being observed, not on the 
metalevel of the observation where the organizing principle, “open 
society,” remains as fixed as the scores of “open works” such as 
the Counting Songs. Whenever “open” is used as a term to describe 
media— such as in open standards, open networks, open source, 
open access, open data— then the same logic of immutability 
remains at work. Openness is standardized in policy documents 
(such as the Open Source Definition [Open Source Initiative 1998], 
the eight criteria of Open Government Data [OpenGovData.org 
2007], the Open Content Definition [Wiley 1998], “gold” and “green” 
open access and the comprehensive Open Definition [Open Defi-
nition 2015]) making all these “terms of media” compliant to, and 
cybernetic heirs of, the Popperian liberal politics equation of open 
science, open markets, and open society.
The myth underlying both these politics and the overall concept  
of open systems is their inherent self- regulation toward “thermo- 
dynamic equilibrium” and “equifinality” toward a “steady state” of a 
system, to quote Popper’s correspondent, the biologist and found-
er of General Systems Theory Ludwig von Bertalanffy (Bertalanffy 
1969). For Popper and Bertalanffy, these principles amounted to a 
general model of science, nature, and politics in the Cold War peri-
od. Ultimately, they are riffs on Adam Smith’s “invisible hand.” In a 
founding manifesto for the open source movement, the software 
developer Eric S. Raymond summed up this ideology as follows: 
“The Linux world behaves in many respects like a free market or an 
ecology, a collection of selfish agents attempting to maximize utility 
which in the process produces a self- correcting spontaneous order 
more elaborate and efficient than any amount of central planning 
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self- regulation, the system is thus not open in the sense of being 
contingent or indeterministic; instead, it is meant to produce a 
desired outcome, with what one could call “liberal” variations. 
The same logic applies to “open work,” including aleatory musical 
composition, action painting, participatory art such as the Counting 
Songs (with their desired outcome of knowing the number of paying 
visitors), and contemporary community art and social design.
The People against Posthumanism
For Popper’s open society and for open source software, the 
desired outcomes were a better society and better software, 
respectively, through systemic processes that are by design self- 
organizing and self- optimizing.27 But just as the Counting Songs 
cease to produce sensible outcomes in a postapocalyptic world 
and end up as no more than a formula running amok, open source 
software ended up as the technological back end of the crapularity, 
with Linux, Apache, MySQL, and PHP driving the commercial web 
and mobile devices (including, to name just a few examples, Goo-
gle’s search engine, Gmail, YouTube, Facebook’s social networking 
platforms, Amazon’s online retail store, Android smartphones and 
tablets, Google’s Chromebooks, the Kindle e- reader, and Tesla’s 
autopilot). The “open society” is now better known under the name 
coined by Popper’s Mont Pelerin Society collaborator Alexander 
Rüstow, “neoliberalism,”28 which has historically proven to be able 
to falsify anything but itself.
This explains the resurgence of fascism and other forms of popu-
lism in the context of the crapularity. On the basis of Carl Schmitt’s 
political theology, populism offers a more honest alternative to 
the existing regime: against equilibrium promises and crapular 
reality, the proposed antidote is the state of exception; against 
invisible hands, the remedy is decision making as a virtue in 
itself, what Schmitt referred to as “decisionism.”29 In other words, 
the states of exception and decisionism that various “systems” 
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postdemocratic powers currently conceal seem to become tangible 
and accountable again through populist reembodiment. “Populism” 
could be literally read as the will to power against “the system,” not 
only a specific system but the concept of system as such (including 
the way in which Popper’s “open society” positions itself). Contem-
porary populism is an attempt to regain agency of people against 
posthuman ecologies, to literally put up the demos, the body of the 
people, against crapularities— whether on occupied squares or at 
fascist campaign rallies.
The tragedy, or farce, of this confrontation is how it often ends up 
as one form of fascism against another: populist fascism against 
Big Data fascism. The algorithm that stigmatizes people of color 
with a higher crime risk and a lower credit score differs from a 
white supremacist— or in continental Europe, “identitarian”— street 
rally only in its symbolic form, not in its semantics and pragmatics. 
Both can be based on the same crapularity analytics, since today’s 
populist street rallies are often the outcome of algorithms that 
bring like- minded people together in online social media echo 
chambers. Either way, subjectivity is destined to remain hard- 
coded into this analytics, even after humanity is literally (and not 
just figuratively) dead and gone.
Notes
For Rasheedah, Camae, and Ras
 1 And also turned certain analysts into another kind of analyst: some languages, 
including German, now differentiate between “Analytiker,” a psychotherapeutic, 
philosophical, or mathematical analyst, and “Analyst,” a stock market, business, 
or data analyst.
 2 I am reusing a term coined by Linda Hilfling Ritasdatter for the accompanying 
symposium to her exhibition Bugs in the War Room at Overgarden, Copenhagen, 
Denmark, May 2016, and for her ongoing PhD research on the 2K bug and the 
legacy programming language Algol.
 3 “Deutschland Katastrophenstaat / Wir leben im Computerstaat / Wir leben im 
Computerstaat / Wir leben im Computerstaat” (Abwärts 1980).
 4 It would be worthwhile to research possible correlations between the surge in 
police shootings of black people since 2014 and the introduction of predictive 
53policing programs in the United States (on the other hand, the availability of 
inexpensive media technology has surely increased the coverage of previously 
unreported incidents, so that correlations are difficult to draw). In their 2016 
paper “Police Killings of Unarmed Black People: Centering Race and Racism 
in Human Behavior and the Social Environment Content,” the social work 
researchers Willie F. Tolliver, Bernadette R. Hadden, Fabienne Snowden, and 
Robyn Brown- Manning argue that “the passage of laws like ‘stand your ground’ 
joined with policing strategies such as ‘broken windows,’ ‘stop and frisk,’ and 
‘predictive policing’ (Eligon and Williams 2015) results in Black and Brown peo-
ple being exposed to surveillance by police, vigilantes, and the general public.”
 5 Autobiographical note: the German edition of this book, published in 1984, in-
troduced the author of the present text to network computing and its criticism.
 6 A similar dispute existed in 1950s American political science over the school of 
behavioralism (not to be confused with behaviorism) whose advocacy for an 
empirical approach of “verification,” “quantification,” and “pure science” was 
critiqued and rejected by Bernard Crick (1959), among others.
 7 “Die Erkenntnis beginnt nicht mit Wahrnehmungen oder Beobachtungen 
oder der Sammlung von Daten oder von Tatsachen, sondern sie beginnt mit 
Problemen.”
 8 Today’s optical sensor technology cannot capture the full range of color infor-
mation present, for example, in Kodachrome slides and film negatives; there-
fore digitization requires a decision regarding the color gamut to be captured. 
After scanning, the captured color range needs to be additionally, and quite 
heavily, compressed in order to fit the even more limited color space and 
dynamic range of computer displays.
 9 “Film emulsions could have been designed initially with more sensitivity to the 
continuum of yellow, brown, and reddish skin tones, but the design process 
would have had to be motivated by a recognition of the need for an extend-
ed dynamic range. At the time film emulsions were developing, the target 
consumer market would have been ‘Caucasians’ in a segregated political scene” 
(Roth 2009, 118).
10 A less rigorous version of this program was carried out in the redesign of West-
ern cities to make them car friendly after the Second World War.
11 A good example are the welcome gifts handed out by public service workers to 
newborn children in some European countries; this also serves as a measure of 
identity control.
12 See Bruno Latour’s related discussion of the doorstop as a nonhuman actor 
performing a previously human task, in Latour 2005, 14– 41.
13 “I wanted to teach my students how to make music for an artificial intelligence 
in the future, but I was told I was not allowed to do that. I said if I cannot do 
that I will leave. And I will not leave silently. This is academic war!” Goodiepal in 
an interview by Aram Yardumian (2012).
14 Hito Steyerl’s comment to the first draft of this paper.
15 German: “Kehre”
16 “In defining the humanity of the human being, humanism not only does not ask 
54 about the relation of being to the essence of the human being; because of its 
metaphysical origin humanism even impedes the question by neither recogniz-
ing nor understanding it” (Heidegger 1998, 245).
17 German: “Existenzphilosophie”
18 “It is no longer possible to think in our day other than in the void left by man’s 
disappearance. For this void does not create a deficiency; it does not consti-
tute a lacuna that must be filled. It is nothing more, and nothing less, than the 
unfolding of a space in which it is once more possible to think” (Foucault 2002, 
373).
19 Haraway (2003, 192) writes that there is a “utopian tradition of imagining a 
world without gender”; while Hayles argues that “cybernetics . . . should be 
called a ‘Manichean science’ ” (Hayles 1999, 106).
20 In Speculative Realism, objects conversely become independent from the 
human perspective, they are no longer “correlationist.” Slavoj Žižek criticizes 
this position to the extent that “the true problem is not to think pre- subjective 
reality, but to think how something like a subject could have emerged within it; 
without this (properly Hegelian) gesture, any objectivism will remain correla-
tionist in a hidden way— its image of ‘reality in itself’ remains correlated (even 
if in a negative way) with subjectivity”. Like Drucker, Žižek insists on the human 
perspective when he states (referring to Lacan and Hegel) that “their problem 
is not ‘how to reach objective reality which is independent of (its correlation 
to) subjectivity,’ but how subjectivity is already inscribed into reality— to quote 
Lacan again, not only is the picture in my eye, but I am also in the picture” 
(Žižek 2012, 643).
21 In 2001, the artist and computer programmer Adrian Ward summed up this 
issue as follows: “we should be thinking about embedding our own creative 
subjectivity into automated systems, rather than naively trying to get a robot 
to have its ‘own’ creative agenda. A lot of us do this day in, day out. We call it 
programming” (Ward 2001).
22. The algorithm proposed by Amir et al. (2016) depends on strong contextual 
cues from unambiguous (social media) messages.
23 “le grand dehors” (Meillassoux 2009).
24 Most prominently in Landow 1992.
25 As opposed to Black 1986 and Srnicek and Williams 2015.
26 Philip K. Dick anticipated this type of crapularity in his 1969 novel Ubik, in which 
a character struggles with a door in his apartment that refuses to open unless 
it is paid with coins and ultimately threatens to sue him because he tries to 
unscrew its lock (Dick 1991, 24).
27 According to the Open Source Initiative (2016), “the promise of open source 
[is]: higher quality, greater reliability, more flexibility, lower cost, and an end 
to predatory vendor lock- in.” In the past, the organization’s rhetoric showed 
an even more optimistic attitude, praising, in 2006 and on the same web page, 
open source for software development “at a speed that, if one is used to the 
slow pace of conventional software development, seems astonishing,” with a 
“rapid evolutionary process” that “produces better software than the traditional 
closed model. . . . Open source software is an idea whose time has finally 
55come. . . . Now it’s breaking out into the commercial world, and that’s changing 
all the rules” (Open Source Initiative 2006).
28 Rüstow understood “neoliberalism” as a synonym of “ordoliberalism,” the 
German (and Northern European) concept of a market liberalism tempered by 
a strong system of checks and balances enforced by the state, including provi-
sions for public welfare. He eventually left the Mont Pelerin Society in disagree-
ment with proponents of radical free market liberalism (Prollius 2007).
29 Schmitt 1985. See also Mouffe 1999.
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Queerying Homophily
Wendy Hui Kyong Chun
To recap, in Pattern Discrimination:
1. YOU is always singular plural:
• Recognition is never at the level of the individual
• You = YOUS value
2. Machines engage in deep dreaming, creating patterns from 
noise.
• Crab in = crap out
• As with the gibbering muses, interpretation and herme-
neutics enter through pattern discrimination, but now 
through the “back door”
• We live in mythic times, but without knowing we do
3. The singularity of the market = the crapularity of the world:
• the dumbing down of humans
• the integration of subjectivity into information 
technologies
• the reality of paranoia
60 4. To come out, we have to come in:
• we are inside when we think we are outside.
• Open societies need enemies to be “open”
This chapter continues these points by examining homophily— the 
axiom that similarity breeds connection— which grounds contem-
porary network science. If we are inside- out, it is because homoph-
ily, love as love of the same, closes the world it pretends to open; it 
makes cyberspace a series of echo chambers. This transformation  
ironically fulfills its purpose as a portal: a portal is an elaborate 
façade that frames the entrance to an enclosed space. Cyberspace 
was always a horizon trapped within in U.S. military- academic net-
works.  Thus, to start with a more contemporary myth:
Once upon a time, a U.S. commerce- free, military, and ac-
ademic inter- networking protocol, Transmission Control 
Protocol/Internet Protocol, became reborn as cyberspace. 
A consensual hallucination, it transformed TCP/IP into its 
opposite: a global, government- free, and anonymous space 
that was fundamentally discrimination- free (because if you 
can’t see it, how can you hate it?). A decentralized network 
allegedly designed to survive a massive, catastrophic flatten-
ing (i.e., nuclear war), it would flatten all hierarchies through 
its boundless expansion. Unfortunately, things did not quite 
turn out as planned. Rather than an endless difference- free 
utopia, the internet became a series of poorly gated commu-
nities that spawned towering, hate- and terror- filled, racist— 
or to some even worse, banal, star- obsessed, cat- infested— 
echo chambers.  This Internet made cyberpunk dystopian 
futures look banal in comparison. Rather than state- free, it 
became a breeding ground for state surveillance, in which 
governments spied on citizens, on foreign nationals, and on 
each other, and in which corporations perfected global track-
ing techniques. The future it augured looked even darker: the 
dusk of human spontaneity via the dawn of Big Data. Soon 
all human actions would be captured, calibrated, predicted, 
61and preempted. Networks, it would seem, were born free and 
yet everywhere were enchained.
People bemoaned, accepted, or embraced this situation 
and offered various explanations for it. They revealed that 
the initial dreams of cyberspace were delusional (as if this 
was profound: the term “cyberspace,” after all, came from 
science fiction; William Gibson in Neuromancer described it 
as a “consensual hallucination”); they argued that the inter-
net had to be purged of the anonymity (it never really had) 
because anonymity was the root of all evil (as if people were 
only obnoxious or nasty under cover); they pointed out that 
echo chambers were produced by “personalization”: corpo-
rate attempts to target individual consumers. What we were 
experiencing: the nightmare of buying “happily ever after.”
This tale is both right and wrong. Yes, the internet changed 
dramatically after its opening/commercialization, but person-
alization alone is not the culprit— and purging the internet of 
anonymity will not make networks any less nasty. “Real Names” 
or unique identifiers lie at heart of Big Data analytics, for they are 
crucial to synching disparate databases and calibrating recycled 
data. Further, if Big Data predictive analytics work, it is not 
because everyone is treated like a special snowflake but because 
network analyses segregate users into “neighborhoods” based 
on their intense likes and dislikes. Further, it “trains” individuals 
to expect and recognize this segregation. Instead of ushering in a 
postracial, postidentitarian era, networks perpetuate identity via 
“default” variables and axioms. In network science, differences and 
similarities— differences as a way to shape similarities— are actively 
sought, shaped, and instrumentalized in order to apprehend 
network structures. Networks are neither unstructured masses nor 
endless rhizomes that cannot be cut or traced. Networks, because 
of their complexities, noisiness, and persistent inequalities, foster 
techniques to manage, prune, and predict. This new method— this 
pattern discrimination— makes older, deterministic, or classically 
analytic methods of control seem innocuous.
62 Homophily (love as love of the same) fuels pattern discrimination. 
The fact that networks perpetuate segregation should surprise 
no one because, again, segregation in the form of homophily lies 
at their conceptual core. Homophily launders hate into collective 
love, a transformation that, as Sara Ahmed has shown, grounds 
modern white supremacism (2004, 123). Homophily reveals and 
creates boundaries within theoretically flat and diffuse networks; it 
distinguishes and discriminates between allegedly equal nodes: it is 
a tool for discovering bias and inequality and for perpetuating it in 
the name of “comfort,” predictability, and common sense. Network 
and data analyses compound and reflect discrimination embedded 
within society. Like the trolls Whitney Phillips has diagnosed as the 
“grimacing poster children for the socially networked world,” they 
engage in “a grotesque pantomime of dominant cultural tropes” 
(2015, 8). Most broadly, this pattern discrimination is linked to a 
larger subsumption of democratic politics to neoliberal market 
economics, with its naïve overvaluing of openness (as discussed 
by Cramer in the preceding chapter) and authenticity (diagnosed 
brilliantly by Elizabeth Bernstein [2007]).
To intervene, we need to realize that this pantomime is not 
simply dramatic, it is also performative— it puts in place the world 
it discovers. It also depends on constantly repeated actions to 
create and sustain nodes and connections. We must thus embrace 
network analyses and work with network scientists to create new 
algorithms, new hypotheses, new grounding axioms. We also need 
to reembrace critical theory: feminism, ethnic studies, decon-
struction, and yes, even psychoanalysis, data analytics’ repressed 
parent. Most crucially, what everyone needs now: training in critical 
ethnic studies.
Machine Learning: Money Laundering  
for Bias?
On June 19, 2016, Pinboard— an account linked to a site advertised 
as “Social Bookmarking for Introverts”— posted the following 
comment to Twitter: “Machine learning is like money laundering 
63for bias” (Pinboard 2016). This post, which was retweeted over a 
thousand times by the end of that summer, encapsulated growing 
suspicions about the objectivity of artificial intelligence and data- 
driven algorithms, suspicions confirmed by Cathy O’Neil in her 
remarkable Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases 
Inequality and Threatens Democracy (2016). During this time period, 
news reports about biases embedded in machine learning abound-
ed. Just two of the stories reported in the mainstream media the 
week of August 28, 2016, include news that:
• Facebook unexpectedly fired its news curators, in a de-
layed response to allegations that its editors deliberately 
suppressed conservative news, charges it had previously 
denied (Thielman 2016). This resulted, as the Guardian 
reported, in the algorithms going “crazy.” Among the top 
stories: a fraudulent one that then Fox News moderator 
Megyn Kelly was fired after she revealed that she was 
backing Hillary Clinton and a real video of a man mastur-
bating with a McDonald’s sandwich. According to some, 
this was because Facebook had not addressed the human 
problem embedded in machine algorithms: Fortune con-
tended that “getting rid of human editors won’t solve Face-
book’s bias problem” because, in the end, the algorithms 
are written by human programmers (Ingram 2016).
• A coalition of civil liberties and civil rights organizations 
issued a statement against predictive policing technolo-
gies. According to this group, the crime data embedded 
in these programs poisoned the results. This data is 
“notoriously suspect, incomplete, easily manipulated, and 
plagued by racial bias” (Lartey 2016). These allegations fol-
lowed a report by Upturn that revealed that these systems 
are not only overhyped, they also “reinforce dispropor-
tionate and discriminatory policing practices” (Robinson 
and Koepke 2016).
These are two of many. There are, as my coauthors have pointed 
out, many more instances of discriminatory algorithms. Other 
stories that broke in 2015– 16 include news that:
64 • Google’s photo app tagged two black people as “gorillas.” 
Vivienne Ming, an artificial intelligence expert argued, 
“some systems struggle to recognize non- white people 
because they were trained on Internet images which are 
overwhelmingly white . . . the bias of the Internet reflects 
the bias of society.” (Revealingly, Babak Hodjat, chief scien-
tist at Sentinet Technologies, hypothesized that this error 
might have stemmed from the fact that the algorithm 
had not seen enough pictures of gorillas; Blarr 2015). This 
misrecognition of nonwhite people by cameras was hardly 
new: as Cramer also notes in his chapter in this volume, 
in 2009 it was revealed that HP Face- Tracking Webcams 
could not recognize black people, and the Nikon S360 
asked its users if smiling Asians were “blinking” (see Frucci 
2015; Lee 2009).
• The COMPAS software used by several U.S. courts to 
predict recidivism— and thus by some to determine sen-
tencing and parole— was biased against racial minorities 
(Angwin et al. 2016).
These cases “revealed” well- documented biases that should not 
have been news. Historically, standard film stock was optimized for 
white skin; for the longest time, interracial filming was difficult not 
only for social reasons but also for technological ones (see Dyer 
1997). As well, racial bias in sentencing within the United States has 
been debated and analyzed for years.1 Further, racism within ma-
chine learning algorithms had been highlighted and predicted by 
numerous scholars: from Dr. Latanya Sweeney’s revelation that “a 
black- identifying name was 25% more likely to get an ad suggestive 
of an arrest record” to predictions of price discrimination based 
on “social sorting”; from “inadvertent” and illegal discriminatory 
choices embedded in hiring software to biased risk profiles within 
terrorism- deterrence systems. These all highlighted the racism 
latent within seemingly objective systems, which, like money 
laundering, cleaned “crooked” data. To many, the solution was thus 
better, cleaner data: crime data, scrubbed free of police bias; more 
65images of black folks in libraries; more diversity within the tech 
industry, so technologies not tested on minorities would not reach 
the consumer market (Harris 2016). The problem, in other words, 
was the still- lingering digital divide.
Other analysts, however, pointed out that it is not simply a 
question of inclusion or exclusion but also of how differences are 
“latently” encoded. For example, Chicago police did not use overtly 
racial categories in their predictive policing algorithm to generate 
a “heat list” of those most likely to murder or be murdered, 
because they did not need to: their “neighborhood”- based system 
effectively discriminated on the basis of race (Saunders, Hunt, 
and Hollywood 2016). This system created “persons of interest” 
based on social ties (as well as personal history). As Kate Crawford 
and Jason Schultz have argued, Big Data compromises privacy 
protections afforded by the U.S. legal system by making personally 
identifiable information about “protected categories” legible 
(Crawford and Schultz 2014). As Faiyaz Al Zamal et al. (2012) have 
shown in their analysis of Twitter, latent attributes such as age and 
political affiliation are easily inferred via a user’s “neighbors.” These 
algorithms, in other words, do not need to track racial and other 
differences, because these factors are already embedded in “less 
crude” categories designed to predict industriousness, reliability, 
homicidal tendencies, et cetera. These algorithms can more 
precisely target key intersectional identities. Tellingly, Christopher 
Wylie— the Cambridge Analytica whistle- blower— told the Guard-
ian’s Carole Cadwalladr that Steven Bannon was the only straight 
man Wylie’s ever talked to about feminist intersectional theory. 
Feminist intersectional theory was first developed by Kimberlé 
Crenshaw (Crenshaw 1991) to explain the violence against women 
of color— through Cambridge Analytica, it became a measure to 
understand “the oppressions that conservative, young white men 
feel” (Cadwalladr 2018). As Susan Brown (personal communication, 
June 2015) has noted, imagine what could be revealed in terms of 
location, class, and race through the category: buys organic  
bird feed.
66 Crucially, these algorithms perpetuate the discrimination they 
“find.” They are not simply descriptive but also prescriptive and per-
formative in all senses of that word. Capture systems, as Phil Agre 
theorized in 1994, reshape the activities they model or “discover.” 
Through a metaphor of human activity as language, they impose 
a normative “grammar of action” as they move from analyzing 
captured data to building an epistemological model of the captured 
activity (364). The Chicago Police’s “heat list,” for instance, did not 
result in a reduction of homocides; it did, however, lead to subjects 
on the list being “2.88 times more likely than their matched 
counterparts to be arrested for a shooting” (Saunders, Hunt, and 
Hollywood 2016). It also possibly led to more homicides: those 
contacted by the police were afraid of being perceived as “snitches” 
by their neighbors (Gorner 2013). Networks create and spawn the 
reality they imagine; they become self- fulfilling prophecies (see 
Chun 2016; Healy 2015). Based on efficiency, they, like all perfor-
mative systems, bypass questions of justice (see Lyotard 1984).
Performativity, however, does not simply mean the reformatting 
and reorganizing of the world “into line with theory” (Healy 2015, 
175). Performative utterances, as Judith Butler and Jacques Derrida 
have argued, depend on iterability and community (Derrida 1988; 
Butler 1997). Butler in particular has revealed the inherent muta-
bility of seemingly immutable and stable categories. Gender, she 
has argued, is performative: “it is real only to the extent that it is 
performed” (Butler 1988, 527). What we understand to be “natural” 
or “essential” is actually “manufactured through a sustained set of 
acts, positioned through the gendered stylization of the body . . . 
what we take to be an ‘internal’ feature of ourselves is one that we 
anticipate and produce through certain bodily acts, at an extreme, 
an hallucinatory effect of naturalized gestures” (Butler 1990, xv). 
These gestures and constant actions are erased/forgotten as 
they congeal into a “comfortable” fixed identity. As Sara Ahmed 
provocatively puts it: “regulative norms function in a way as 
repetitive strain injuries” (Ahmed 2004, 145). This understanding 
of performativity adds a further dimension to analyses of network 
67performativity, for this performativity courses through networks. 
As I’ve argued more fully in Updating to Remain the Same (Chun 
2016), networks do not simply enact what they describe, their most 
basic units— nodes and ties— are also themselves the consequence 
of performative, habitual actions.
So: what would happen if we engaged, rather than decried, 
network performativity? How different could this pantomime 
called networks be? Crucially, to take up this challenge we must 
realize the expressive impact of our mute actions. If Big Data, as 
Antoinette Rouvroy among others have argued, devalues human 
language by privileging bodily actions over narratives, it does so 
via capture systems that, as Agre points out, translate our actions 
into “grammars of actions” (Rouvroy 2011). Our silent— and not so 
silent— actions register.
To take up this challenge, we also need to move beyond dismissing 
Big Data as hype and celebrating “missed” predictions as evidence 
of our unpredictability. The gap between prediction and actuality 
should not foster snide comfort, especially since random recom-
mendations are increasingly deliberately seeded to provoke spon-
taneous behavior. The era of Big Data is arguably a future that we 
reach, if we do, asymptotically, and the fact that Big Data is hype 
is hardly profound: most of technology is. Further, Big Data poses 
fascinating computational problems (how does one analyze data 
that one can read in once, if at all?). The plethora of correlations it 
documents also raises fundamental questions about causality: If 
almost anything can be shown to be real (if almost any correlation 
can be discovered), how do we know what matters, what is true? 
The “pre- Big Data” example of the “Super Bowl predictor” nicely 
encapsulates this dilemma, for one of the best predictors of the 
U.S. stock market is the result of the Super Bowl: if an NFC team 
wins, it will likely be a bull market; if an AFC team wins, it will be a 
bear market (Silver 2012, 185). This example also poses the ques-
tion: what does knowledge do? What is the relationship between 
knowledge and action? The best analogy for Big Data is the map-
ping of the human genome: before this mapping was actualized, it 
68 was envisioned as the Holy Grail, or the Rosetta Stone for human 
illness. Rather than simply resulting in the cure for cancer and so 
forth, it raised new awareness about the importance of epigenesis, 
gene interactions, disease pathways, et cetera.
It is critical that we realize that the gap between prediction and 
reality is the space for political action and agency. Predictions can 
be “self- canceling” as well as self- fulfilling (Silver 2012, 219). Like 
global climate change and human population models, they can 
point to realities and futures to be rejected. They can, through their 
diagnosis, render impotent the predictive power of a symptom or 
enable new, unforeseen, grammars. To create new expressions, 
however, we need to read the scripts and analyze the set we find 
ourselves in the midst of, that is, the laboratory of network science.
Networks: The Science of  
Neoliberal Connections
At the most basic level, network science captures— that is, analyzes, 
articulates, imposes, instrumentalizes, and elaborates— connection 
(see the five stages of capture, Agre 1994). It is “the study of the 
collection, management, analysis, interpretation, and presenta-
tion of relational data”2 (Brandes et al. 2013, 3). Described as 
fundamentally interdisciplinary, it brings together physics, biology, 
economics, social psychology, sociology, and anthropology. Put 
more extremely, it merges the quantitative social sciences with the 
physical and computer sciences in order to bypass or eliminate the 
humanities and media studies, two fields also steeped in theories 
of representation and networks. According to the acclaimed 
network scientist and author Albert- László Barabási, network 
science obviates the need for human psychology: “In the past, if 
you wanted to understand what humans do and why they do it, 
you became a card- carrying psychologist. Today you may want to 
obtain a degree in computer science . . . .” This is because network 
science, combined with “increasingly penetrating digital technol-
ogies,” places us in “an immense research laboratory that, in size, 
69complexity, and detail, surpasses everything that science has en-
countered before.” This lab reveals “the rhythms of life as evidence 
of a deeper order in human behavior, one that can be explored, 
predicted, and no doubt exploited” (Barabási 2010, 11). Network 
science unravels a vast collective nonconscious, encased within the 
fishbowl of digital media.3 It is the bastard child of psychoanalysis: 
there are no accidents, no innocent slips of the tongue. Each action 
is part of a larger pattern/symptom. The goal: to answer that unan-
swerable question, what do (wo)men want?
Network science responds to increased global connectivity and 
capitalism, to “a growing public fascination with the complex 
‘connectedness’ of modern society” (Easley and Kleinberg 2010, 11). 
As Duncan Watts, a pioneer in this field, explains, “if this particular 
period in the world’s history had to be characterized in any simple 
way, it might be as one that is more highly, more globally, and 
more unexpectedly connected than at any time before it.” Network 
science is crucial to mapping and navigating “the connected age” 
(Watts 2004).
Network science is a version of what Fredric Jameson once called 
“cognitive mapping” (Jameson 1990). It is the neoliberal cure for 
postmodern ills (see Chun 2016). Postmodernism, according to 
Jameson, submerged subjects “into a multidimensional set of 
radically discontinuous realities, whose frames range from the still 
surviving spaces of bourgeois private life all the way to the unimag-
inable decentering of global capital itself” (Jameson 1991, 413). 
Because of this, they were profoundly disoriented, unable to con-
nect their local experience (authenticity) to global systems (truth). 
To resolve this situation, Jameson called for cognitive mapping, a 
yet imaginable form of political socialist art, which corresponded 
to “an imperative to grow new organs, to expand our sensorium 
and our body to some new, yet unimaginable, perhaps ultimately 
impossible, dimensions” (39). Like the cognitive mapping Jameson 
envisioned, network science lifts the fog of postmodernism by re-
vealing the links between the individual to the totality in which she 
lives. Unlike Jameson’s vision, it is hardly socialist or empowering. 
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world into a map: it forces a mode of authenticity shaped to an 
artificially intelligent truth.
Network science reduces real- world phenomena to a series of 
nodes and edges, which are in turn modeled to expose the pat-
terns governing seemingly disparate behaviors, from friendship to 
financial crises. This mapping depends on dramatic simplifications 
of real world phenomena.4 In fact, these “discovered” relations 
are vast simplifications of vast simplifications, with each phase 
of network theory— initial abstraction/representation followed 
by mathematical modeling— producing its own type of abstrac-
tion. The first is “applied” and “epistemological”: It suggests and 
explicates “for given research domains, how to abstract phenom-
ena into networks. This includes, for example, what constitutes 
an individual entity or a relationship, how to conceptualize the 
strength of a tie, etc.” (Easley and Kleinberg 2010, 2). Most simply, 
in this stage, one decides what is a node, what is an edge, and how 
they should be connected. The second is “pure” network theory, for 
it deals “with formalized aspects of network representations such 
as degree distributions, closure, communities, etc., and how they 
relate to each other. In such pure network science, the corre-
sponding theories are mathematical— theories of networks” (5). 
In this second phase, the goal is to build a model that reproduces 
the abstraction produced in stage one. Whatever does so is then 
considered true or causal. This two- step process highlights the 
tightrope between empiricism and modeling that network science 
walks: network science models not the real world but rather the 
initial representation and truth is what reproduces this abstraction.
These abstract relations reveal and construct a complex relation-
ship between the local and the global. Fundamentally, network 
science is nonnormative: it does not assume that aggregate 
behaviors stem from identical agents acting identically. It connects 
previously discontinuous scales— the local and global, the micro 
and the macro— by engaging dependencies that were previously 
“filtered” or controlled for. It, as the authors of the inaugural 
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evaluation of dependency and structure. Rather than defining the 
domain of variables as a simple set without a structure, it assumes 
“at least some variables . . . to have structure. The potentially 
resulting dependencies are not a nuisance but more often than 
not they constitute the actual research interest” (Brandes et al. 
2013, 8).5 These dependencies go beyond correlations within actor 
attribute variables (such as the relation between income and age) 
to encompass the entire set of network variables. Network vari-
ables are themselves defined in terms of pairs, which are valued 
according to their degree (or not) of connection (for instance, 1 for 
connected; 0 for not). These variables in turn affect one another: 
“the crucial point is that the presence of one tie may influence the 
presence of another. . . . While this will appear an unfamiliar point 
of view to some, it is merely a statement that networks may be 
systematically patterned. Without dependence among ties, there 
is no emergent network structure (Brandes et al. 2013, 10).6 At all 
levels, networks are dynamic and interdependent. What matters 
then is understanding and creating interdependencies.
Currently, modeling these interdependencies— tying global events 
to individual interactions— entails the marriage of graph theory 
with game theory, or other agent- based modeling. Computer 
scientist Jon Kleinberg’s collaboration with economist David 
Easley exemplifies this fruitful combination. In their canonical 
and excellent textbook, Networks, Markets, and Crowds, based on 
their class at Cornell (now a popular EdX MOOC with Eva Tardos), 
they explain that understanding networks requires apprehending 
two levels of connectedness: “connectedness at the level of 
structure— who is connected to whom— and . . . connectedness 
at the level of behavior— the fact that each individual’s actions 
have implicit consequences for the outcomes of everyone in the 
system” (Easley and Kleinberg 2010, 4). Global concerns impact 
local decisions, and local effects often only manifest themselves 
at global scales.7 Network science thus spans the two extremes— 
macro- level structure and micro- level behavior— by mapping the 
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localized interactions” (6). Networks, Markets, and Crowds explicitly 
draws from graph theory and game theory, showing how this 
combination can explain seemingly “irrational” phenomena such as 
information cascades.
As the turn to game theory reveals, a market- based logic perme-
ates network science models (a theme pursued later in this series 
by the Markets book by Armin Beverungen, Philip Mirowski, Edward 
Nik- Khah, and Jens Schroeter). Most generally, capture systems are 
justified and praised as inherently more efficient and empowering 
(and thus more democratic) than older disciplinary or firm- based 
ones. Agre hypothesizes that
the computer practitioner’s practice of capture is  
instrumental to a process by which economic actors 
reduce their transaction costs and thereby help trans-
form productive activities along a trajectory towards an 
increasingly detailed reliance upon (or subjection to)  
market relations. The result is a generalized acceleration 
of economic activity whose social benefits in terms of pro-
ductive efficiency are clear enough but whose social costs 
ought to be a matter of concern. (Agre 1994, 121– 22)
Most succinctly: capture systems transform all transactions into 
market- based ones so that computerization = liberalization. 
Although Agre stresses that this relation is historically contingent 
and itself the product of a “kind of representational crusade” (120), 
he nonetheless hypothesizes that this relation, which “presupposes 
that the entire world of productive activities can be conceptualized, 
a priori, in terms of extremely numerous episodes of exchanges 
among economic actors,” constitutes the political economy of 
capture (121). The language of “costs” not only underlies Agre’s 
own critical language, it also litters the literature on networks: from 
attempts to model (and thus understand) collective action and 
critical mass (Centola 2013) to those that map differential network-
ing techniques of women and minorities (Ibarra 1993) to those that 
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seek to identify the impact of influential or susceptible members 
of social networks (Aral and Walker 2012) to those that analyze the 
“payoffs” of social capital within immigrant networks (Ooka and 
Wellman 2006). As this last example reveals, this market- based 
logic also presumes the existence of “social capital,” a concept 
Pierre Bourdieu tied to group membership and accreditation.8
In the current literature, social capital explains lingering inequality 
among individuals. It explains disparities in success that cannot 
be explained in terms of individual differences in “human capital,” 
that is, differences in intelligence, physical appearances, and skill 
(Burt 2002). According to sociologist Ronald S. Burt, social capital is 
a “metaphor or advantage” within a society “viewed as a market in 
which people exchange all variety of goods and ideas in pursuit of 
their interests.” It reveals that
the people who do better are somehow better connected. 
Certain people or certain groups are connected to cer-
tain others, trusting certain others, obligated to support 
certain others, dependent on exchange with certain oth-
ers. Holding a certain position in the structure of these 
exchanges can be an asset in its own right. That asset is 
social capital, in essence, a concept of location effects in 
differentiated markets. (Burt 1992, 150)
A relational form of capital, it grants advantage to those who invest 
in social relations. It thrives off “trust” and obligation.
Marion Fourcade and Kieran Healy have refined this notion of 
relational capital, arguing that this form of capital is really “über- 
capital,” which is tied to “one’s position and trajectory according 
to various scoring, grading, and ranking methods. . . . An example 
would be the use of credit scores by employers or apartment 
owners as an indicator of an applicant’s ‘trustworthiness’ ” (Four-
cade and Healy 2016, 10).9 Fourcade and Healy’s analysis thus 
reveals the actuarial mechanisms that construct the “trust” that 
Burt assumes. The term “über” denotes “the meta- , generalized, 
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“cloud”. . . . the term über also connotes something or someone 
who is extra- ordinary, who stands above the world and others . . .” 
(23). This form of capital categorizes consumers based on their 
“habitus” in order to make “good matches” between products and 
consumers. Crucially, the categories employed by corporations do 
not explicitly reference race/gender/class, for they are based on 
actions rather than inherent traits. Thus,
everyone seems to get what they deserve. Eschewing 
stereotypes, the individualized treatment of financial 
responsibility, work performance, or personal fitness by 
various forms of predictive analytics becomes harder to 
contest politically, even though it continues to work as 
a powerful agent of symbolic and material stratification. 
In other words, Übercapital subsumes circumstance and 
social structure into behavior. (33, 38)
The emphasis— in all capture systems— is on translating and figur-
ing actions.
As the above discussions of social capital and capture imply, 
network science, as currently formulated, is the science of 
neoliberalism. To be clear, this is not to blame network science for 
neoliberalism—or to claim that network scientists are inherently 
neoliberal—but to highlight the fact that the many insights network 
science currently produce are deeply intertwined with the neolib-
eral system they presuppose. Neoliberalism, as Wendy Brown has 
argued, is based on inequality and “financialized human capital”: 
“When we are figured as human capital in all that we do and in very 
venue,” she reveals, “equality ceases to be our presumed natural 
relation with one another” (Brown 2015, 179). Brown elucidates the 
social impact of capture systems, with their relentless rendering 
of all human actions in terms of “transactions costs,” namely the 
destruction of democracy through the reduction of “freedom and 
autonomy to unimpeded market behavior and the meaning of 
citizenship to mere enfranchisement.” Crucially,
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panied by unprecedented challenges to democratization, 
including complex forms and novel concentrations of 
economic and political power, sophisticated marketing 
and theatricality in politics, corporately owned media, and 
a historically unparalleled glut of information and opinion 
that, again, produced an illusion of knowledge, freedom, 
and even participation in the face of their opposites. (179)
These unprecedented challenges enumerated by Brown are exactly 
the challenges that network science manages by reducing public 
life to “problem solving and program implementation, a casting 
that brackets or eliminates politics, conflict, and deliberation about 
common values or ends” (127). Network science, as the rest of this 
chapter will explain, valorizes consensus, balance, and “comfort”: it 
validates and assumes segregation by focusing on individual “pref-
erence,” rather than institutional constraints and racism.
That is, to complement Fourcade and Healy’s analysis and to draw 
from my Updating to Remain the Same: Habitual New Media, we need 
to understand how seemingly individualized scores coincide with 
“older” racial and class categories. Network categorizations do 
not only depend on your actions but on actions of your so- called 
neighbors— you are constantly compared to and lumped in with 
others. Advertisers divide the population into types such as “rising 
prosperity” and then subdivide that category into others such as 
“city sophisticates,” which in turn produces categories such as 
“townhouse cosmopolitans” (see ACORN, developed by CACI). 
Neoliberalism destroys society by proliferating neighborhoods. 
Networks preempt and predict by reading all singular actions as 
indications of larger collective habitual patterns, based not on our 
individual actions but rather the actions of others. Correlations, 
that is, are not made based solely on an individual’s actions and 
history but rather the history and actions of others “like” him or 
her. Through the analytic of habits, individual actions coalesce 
bodies into monstrously connected chimeras. That is, if as  
Barabási argues, “in order to predict the future, you first need  
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uncovering the past far easier than before, they have done so  
not simply through individual surveillance but through homophily 
(McPherson, Smith- Lovin, and Cook 2001). Homophily is the  
mechanism by which individuals “stick” together, and “wes” 
 emerge. It is crucial to what Sara Ahmed has diagnosed as “the 
cultural politics of emotion”: a circulation of emotions as a form  
of capital.
Homophily: Laundering “Our” Past
At the heart of network science is the principle of homophily: 
the axiom that “similarity breeds connection” (McPherson, 
Smith- Lovin, and Cook 2001). Homophily structures networks by 
creating clusters; by doing so, it also makes networks searchable 
(Marsden 1988; Jackson 2008). Homophily grounds network 
growth and dynamics, by fostering and predicting the likelihood 
of ties. Homophily— now a “commonsense” concept that slips 
between effect and cause— assumes and creates segregation; it 
presumes consensus and similarity within local clusters, making 
segregation a default characteristic of network neighborhoods. In 
valorizing “voluntary” actions, even as it troubles simple notions of 
“peer influence” and contagion, it erases historical contingencies, 
institutional discrimination, and economic realities (Kandel 1978; 
Aral, Muchnik, and Sundaraajan 2013). It serves as an alibi for the 
inequality it maps, while also obviating politics: homophily (often 
allegedly of those discriminated against)— not racism, sexism, and 
inequality— becomes the source of inequality, making injustice 
“natural” and “ecological.” It turns hate into love and transforms 
individuals into “neighbors” who naturally want to live together, 
which assumes that neighborhoods should be filled with people 
who are alike. If we thus manage to “love our neighbor”— once 
considered a difficult ethical task— it is because our neighbors are 
virtually ourselves. Homophily makes anomalous conflicting opin-
ions, cross- racial relationships, and heterosexuality, among many 
other things.
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in their definitive review article on homophily, “the homophily 
principle . . . structures network ties of every type, including marriage, 
friendship, work, advice, support, information transfer, exchange, 
co- membership, and other types of relationship” (2001, 415). As a 
result, “people’s personal networks are homogeneous with regard 
to many sociodemographic, behavioral, and intrapersonal charac-
teristics.” Rather than framing homophily as historically contingent, 
they understand it as fundamental and timeless: indeed, they start 
their review with quotations from Aristotle and Plato about similarity 
determining friendship and love (which they admit in a footnote may 
be misleading, since Aristotle and Plato also claimed that opposites 
attract— indeed, homophily renders heterosexuality anomalous— a 
mysterious fact to be explained). Homophily, according to McPherson 
et al., is the result of and factor in “human ecology” (415).
Homophily sits at the fold between network structure and 
individual agency. As McPherson et al. summarize the “remarkably 
robust” patterns of homophily across numerous and diverse 
studies, they also break down homophily into two types: baseline 
homophily (“homophily effects that are created by the demography 
of the potential tie pool”) and inbreeding homophily (“homophily 
measured as explicitly over and above the opportunity set”) (419). 
McPherson et al. also reiterate Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Robert K. 
Merton’s influential division of homophily into “status homophily,” 
and “value homophily”:
Status homophily includes the major sociodemographic 
dimensions that stratify society— ascribed characteristics 
like race, ethnicity, sex, or age, and acquired character-
istics like religion, education, occupation, or behavior 
patterns. Value homophily includes the wide variety of 
internal states presumed to shape our orientation toward 
future behavior. (McPherson, Smith- Lovin, and Cook, 419)
In their review, the authors note that race and ethnicity are clearly 
the “biggest divide in social networks today in the United States,” 
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following causes of homophily: geography (“the most basic source 
of homophily is space,” (429); family ties (431); organizational foci, 
occupational, family, and informal roles (80); cognitive processes 
(434); and selective tie dissolution (435). Remarkably missing  
are: racism and discrimination, at personal or institutional levels,  
and history. In the world of networks, love, not hate, drives  
segregation.
Given that the very notion of homophily emerges from studies of 
segregation, the “discovery” of race as a divisive factor is hardly 
surprising. Lazarsfeld and Merton’s 1954 text, in which they coined 
the terms “homophily” and “heterophily” (inspired by friendship 
categorizations of the “savage Trobianders whose native idiom 
at least distinguishes friendships within one’s in- group from 
friendships outside this social circle”) analyzes friendship patterns 
within two towns: “Craftown, a project of some seven hundred 
families in New Jersey, and Hilltown, a bi- racial, low- rent project of 
about eight hundred families in western Pennsylvania” (Lazarfeld 
and Merton 1954, 18– 66, 23, 21). Crucially, they do not assume 
homophily as a grounding principle, nor do they find homophily 
to be “naturally” present. Rather, documenting both homophily 
and heterophily, they ask: “what are the dynamic processes 
through which the similarity or opposition of values shape the 
formation, maintenance, and disruption of close friendships?” (28). 
Homophily in their much- cited chapter is one instance of friendship 
formation— and one that emerges by studying the interactions 
between “liberal” and “illiberal” white residents of Hilltown (27). 
The responses of the black residents were ignored, since all these 
residents were classified as “liberal.” As Samantha Rosenthal has 
noted, the very concept of value homophily is thus enfolded within 
status homophily (personal correspondance).  Value and status 
are not separate—and value increasingly is used as a “code word” 
for race- and class-based distinctions. The implications of this 
segregation have been profound for the further development of 
network principles, as well as U.S. housing policy.
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science, in which homophily has moved problem to solution. 
In the move from “representation” to “model,” homophily is no 
longer something to be accounted for, but rather something that 
“naturally” accounts for and justifies persistence of inequality 
within facially equal systems. It has become axiomatic, that is, 
common sense, thus limiting the scope and possibility of network 
science.10 As Easley and Kleinberg— again two of the most insightful 
and important scholars working in the field— explain: “one of the 
most basic notions governing the structure of social networks is 
homophily— the principle that we tend to be similar to our friends.” 
To make this point, they point to the distribution of “our” friends. 
“Typically,” they write,
your friends don’t look like a random sample of the un-
derlying population. Viewed collectively, your friends are 
generally similar to you along racial and ethnic dimen-
sions: they are similar in age; and they are also similar in 
characteristics that are more or less mutable, including 
the places they live, their occupations, their interests, be-
liefs, and opinions. Clearly most of us have specific friend-
ships that cross all these boundaries; but in aggregate, 
the pervasive fact is that links in a social network tend to 
connect people who are similar to one another. (Easley 
and Kleinberg, 78)
Homophily is a “pervasive fact” that governs the structure of 
networks. As a form of natural governance— based on presump-
tions about “comfort”— it grounds network models, which not 
surprisingly also “discover” segregation.11 Like many other texts, 
Damon Centola et al.’s analysis in “Homophily, Cultural Drift, and 
the Co- Evolution of Cultural groups,” lists “comfort” as one of 
the reasons “why homophily is such a powerful force in cultural 
dynamics.” Referencing the work of Lazarsfeld and Merton, Centola 
states: “Psychologically, we often feel justified in our feel more 
comfortable opinions when we are surrounded by others who 
share the same beliefs— what Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954) call 
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interact with others who share a similar background (i.e., status ho-
mophily)” (Centola et al. 2007, 906). To model the effects of cultural 
drift— and thus to show why globalization does not/will not impose 
a monoculture— the authors make the following assumption:
in our approach to studying cultural dynamics, if cultural 
influence processes create differentiation between two 
neighbors such that they have no cultural traits in com-
mon, we allow these individuals to alter the structure of 
the social network by dropping their tie and forming new 
ties to other individuals. Thus, in our specification of ho-
mophily, the network of social interactions is not fixed . . . 
but rather evolves in tandem with the actions of the indi-
viduals. (908)
Embedded, then, in the very dynamics of network science is the 
presumption that there can be no neighbors without common 
cultural traits. Remarkably, this assumption uses Lazarsfeld and 
Merton’s work— which, as noted earlier, did not find homophily to 
be “natural”— to ground their model’s dynamics. Not surprisingly, 
Centola et al. “discover” that homophily creates “cultural niches” 
(926). Homophily, in so many ways, “governs” networks structure.
The point is this: although many authors such as Easley and 
Kleinberg insist that homophily “is often not an end point in itself 
but rather the starting point for deeper questions— questions 
that address why the homophily is present, how its underlying 
mechanisms will affect the further evolution of the network, and 
how these mechanisms interact with possible outside attempts to 
influence the behavior of people in the network” (83), homophily as 
a starting point cooks the ending point it discovers. Not only does 
it limit the databases used for models— these studies often draw 
from the same database, such as the National Longitutindal Study 
of Adolescent Health (ADD Health) or Facebook or Myspace, since 
these studies already include “friend” as a category— homophily 
also accentuates the clusters network science “discovers.” In 
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closure,” another fundamental and “intuitive” principle of networks, 
which posits that “if two people in a social network have a friend 
in common, then there is an increased likelihood they will become 
friends themselves at some point in the future” (44) Although 
sometimes considered as a “structural” cause outside of homophi-
ly, it also presumes homophilous harmony and consensus. The rea-
sons often given for this “very natural” phenomena are: opportu-
nity (if A spends time with both B and C, then there is an increased 
chance that they will become friends), trust, and incentive (“if A is 
friends with B and C, then it becomes a source of latent stress in 
these relationship if B and C are not friends with each other” [45]). 
Network science posits nonconnection as unsustainable— a cause 
of stress. Conflict as a tie is difficult to conceive. Crucially, social 
networks such as Facebook (again the model organism for network 
science) amplify the effects of “triadic closure” and “social balance.” 
By revealing the friends of friends— and by insisting that friendship 
be reciprocal— it makes triadic closure part of its algorithm: it is 
not simply predicted, it is predicative. As Andreas Wimmer and 
Kevin Lewis point out in “Beyond and Below Racial Homophily: 
ERG Models of a Friendship Network Documented on Facebook,” 
Facebook’s demands for reciprocity produces homophilous effects 
(Wimmer and Lewis 2010).
Again, homophily not only erases conflict, it also naturalizes 
discrimination. Segregation is what’s “recovered” and justified if 
homophily is assumed. Easley and Kleinberg state quite simply 
that “one of the most readily perceived effects of homophily is the 
formation of ethnically and racially homogeneous neighborhoods 
in cities” (96). To explain this, they turn to the “Schelling model” of 
segregation, a simulation that maps the movement of “two distinct 
types of agents” in a grid. The grounding constraint is the desire of 
each agent “to have at least some other agents of its own as type of 
neighbors” (97). Showing results for this simulation, they note that 
spatial segregation happens even when no individual agent seeks 
it: the example for t = 4 (therefore, each agent would be happy as 
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they write:
Segregation does not happen because it has been subtly 
built into the model: agents are willing to be in the minori-
ty, and they could all be satisfied if only we were able to 
carefully arrange them in an integrated pattern. The prob-
lem is that, from a random start, it is very hard for the 
collection of agents to find such integrated patterns. . . . 
In the long run, the process tends to cause segregated 
regions to grow at the expense of more integrated ones. 
The overall effect is one in which the local preferences 
of individual agents have produced a global pattern that 
none of them necessarily intended.
This point is ultimate at the heart of the model: 
although segregation in real life is amplified by a genuine 
desire within some fraction of the population to belong 
to large clusters of similar people— either to avoid people 
who belong to other groups, or to acquire a critical mass 
of members from one’s own group— such factors are not 
necessary for segregation to occur. The underpinnings 
of segregation are already present in a system where 
individuals simply want to avoid being in too extreme a 
minority in their own local area. (101)
I cite this at length because this interpretation reveals the dangers 
of homophily. The long history and legacy of race- based slavery 
within the United States is completely erased, as well as the im-
portance of desegregation to the civil rights movement. There are 
no random initial conditions. The “initial conditions” found within 
the United States and the very grounding presumption that agents 
have a preference regarding the number of “alike” neighbors are 
problematic. This desire not to be in a minority— and to move 
if one is— maps most accurately the situations of white flight, a 
response to desegregation. Further, if taken as an explanation 
for gentrification, it portrays the movement of minorities to more 
affordable and less desirable areas as voluntary, rather than as the 
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institutions are not to blame for segregation, it is because institu-
tional actions are rendered invisible in these models.
Thomas C. Schelling’s original publication makes this deliberate 
erasure of institutions and economics, as well as its engagement 
with white flight (or “neighborhood tipping”), clear. His now classic 
“Dynamic Models of Segregation” was published in 1971, during the 
heart of the civil rights movement and at the beginning of forced 
school desegregation.12 Schelling, in his paper, acknowledges that 
he is deliberately excluding two main processes of segregation: 
organized action (it thus does not even mention the history of 
slavery and legally enforced segregation) and economic segrega-
tion, even though “economic segregation might statistically explain 
some initial degree of segregation” (145). Economic assumptions, 
however, are embedded at all levels in his model. Deliberate 
analogies to both economics and evolution ground his analysis of 
the “surprising results” of unorganized individual behavior.13 He 
uses economic language to explain what he openly terms “dis-
criminatory behavior.”14 At the heart of his model lies immutable 
difference: “I assume,” he asserts,
a population exhaustively divided into two groups; every-
one’s membership is permanent and recognizable. Ev-
erybody is assumed to care about the color of the people 
he lives among and able to observe the number of blacks 
and whites that occupy apiece of territory. Everybody has 
a particular location at any moment; and everybody is 
capable of moving if he is dissatisfied with the color mix-
ture where he is. The numbers of blacks and whites, their 
color preferences, and the sizes of ‘neighborhoods’ will be 
manipulated. (149)
These assumptions are troubling and loaded. They erase the 
history of redlining and other government sanctioned programs 
that made it almost impossible for black citizens to buy homes in 
certain neighborhoods, while helping white citizens buy homes 
84 in new developments (Rothstein 2017). They also cover over the 
oftentimes troubling fluidity of racial identity within the United 
States, in particular the “one drop rule,” which grounded segrega-
tion and effectively made black and white identity not about visible 
differences. As well, homophily maps hate as love. How do you 
show you love the same? By running away when others show up.
The erasure of history and qualitative theories about race, 
gender, and sexuality within social network models represents 
and reproduces troubling assumptions that many, within the 
humanities especially (but not only: think here of the overwhelming 
notion of the United States as “postracial” during the beginning of 
the Obama presidency) had thought were history. Judith Butler’s 
definitive analysis of gender performativity at the end of the last 
century, combined with work in queer theory and trans studies, 
has made gender mutability a default assumption. The critique of 
race as socially constructed, which gained widespread acceptance 
after the horrors of the Holocaust, have been buttressed by careful 
historical, empirical, and theoretical studies: from Michael Omi and 
Howard Winant’s canonical Racial Formation in the United States 
(1994) to Alondra Nelson’s analysis of the genetics and race in the 
Social Life of DNA: Race, Reparations, and Reconciliation after the 
Genome (2016), from Paul Gilroy’s controversial and provocative 
Against Race: Imagining Political Culture beyond the Color Line (2000) 
to Grace Elizabeth Hale’s thorough examination of the Southern 
myth of absolute racial difference in Making Whiteness: The Culture 
of Segregation in the South, 1890– 1940 (1998).
Combined with so many more works, these texts document the  
rise of the modern concept of race during the era of Enlighten-
ment; its centrality to colonization and slavery; its seeming zenith 
during the era of eugenics; its transformations after World War II; 
and its resurgence as an “invisible” marker in genetics. All of this is 
ignored within network science, when “race,” “gender,” and other 
differences are solidified as node characteristics. All of this drives 
twenty- first century echo chambers and politics. So what to do?
85Co- relation not Correlation
Crucially, simply insisting on the fluidity of racial categories or 
“deconstructing” assumptions is not enough. Some work in net-
work science does question assumptions behind racial homophily. 
As mentioned previously, Andreas Wimmer and Kevin Lewis have 
revealed that effects, understood as caused by “racial homophily,” 
are usually caused by other factors: from homophily among 
coethnic groups rather than racial groups (so, underlying “Asian” 
homophily are tendencies of South Asians to befriend South 
Asians; Chinese other Chinese, et cetera) to homophily based on 
“socioeconomic status, regional background, and shared cultural 
taste” (143), to the “balancing mechanisms” employed by social 
media sites. (Importantly, this study was based on an extensive 
analysis of Facebook pages of an entire college cohort of 1,640 
students.) Although this work in intersectionality is important, it is 
not enough, especially since intersectionality, as mentioned earlier, 
is exactly what “proxy factors” target, and also because this work 
still assumes homophily, but at different “ethnic” levels.
To create a different world, we need to question default assump-
tions about homophily. As Sara Ahmed has argued in The Cultural 
Politics of Emotion, “love of the same” is never innocent: white 
supremacist love, for instance, is based on a hatred of others 
(Ahmed 2004). The movement away from others, which grounds 
models of homophily, reveals the extent to which hatred precedes 
homophily. The hatred that networks foster, then, should surprise 
no one. Hatred, Ahmed stresses, organizes bodies. It is an emo-
tional “investment” that makes certain bodies responsible for pain 
or injury. It organizes by bringing things and bodies together— by 
linking certain figures together so they become a common threat, 
an X to “our” O. Hate transforms the particular into the general: it 
transforms individuals into types so they become a common threat 
(I hate you because you are Y). It also transforms Is into wes who 
are threatened by this other. Homophily is never innocent: the very 
construction of Xs and Os, who define their discomfort in relation 
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makes possible strong bonds that define a core against a periph-
ery. Thus, it is not only that network science seemingly makes the 
modeling of conflict impossible, it does so while also hiding conflict 
as friendship.
What this makes clear is the following: rather than mutual 
ignorance, apathy, or revulsion, what is needed is engagement, 
discussion, and yes, even conflict, in order to imagine and perform 
a different future. The proliferation of echo chambers and the era-
sure of politics is not inevitable— we can make them self- canceling 
prophecies. Although this will entail more than different network 
algorithms, these algorithms are a good place to start. What if we 
heeded Safiya Noble’s analysis of how Google searches spread 
sexism and racism, and her call for better, public search engines 
(2018)? What if we took up Joanne Sison and Warren Sack’s chal-
lenge to build democratic search engines, that is, search engines 
that gave users the most diverse rather than the most popular 
results)? How would this challenge assumptions about the “power 
law” (rich get richer; poor get poorer), which these algorithms 
foster, as well as discover? What would happen if ties did not 
represent friendship but rather conflict? What other world would 
emerge if clusters represented difference rather than similarities? 
What other ways would be revealed of navigating the world and of 
making recommendations?
Vi Hart, in her remarkable remodeling of Schelling— The Parable of 
the Polygons  (2017)— makes explicit the relationship between initial 
conditions and history. Further, her model takes the desire for 
desegregation, rather than segregation, as the default. The lessons 
learned are thus:
 1. Small individual bias → Large collective bias. 
When someone says a culture is shapist, they’re not 
saying the individuals in it are shapist. They’re not at-
tacking you personally.
87 2. The past haunts the present. 
Your bedroom floor doesn’t stop being dirty just coz 
you stopped dropping food all over the carpet. Creating 
equality is like staying clean: it takes work. And it’s al-
ways a work in progress.
 3. Demand diversity near you.
If small biases created the mess we’re in, small anti- 
biases might fix it. Look around you. Your friends, your 
colleagues, that conference you’re attending. If you’re 
all triangles, you’re missing out on some amazing 
squares in your life— that’s unfair to everyone. Reach 
out, beyond your immediate neighbors. (Hart and 
Case 2017)
Fox Harrell, a pioneer in computational media studies, also offers 
a different way to engage computational modeling. Fox Harrell’s 
work asks: how can A.I. generate new and more humane inter-
actions? In contrast to most computational identity systems that 
incorrectly reify identity categories by implementing them as simple 
data fields (e.g., selecting gender from a brief drop- down menu) 
or a collection of attributes (e.g., races represented as modifiers 
to numerical statistics and constrained graphical characteristics 
in computer games), he has developed the AIR (Advanced Identity 
Representation) project to produce “computational models of 
subjective identity phenomena related to categorization such as 
specific forms of marginalization that are overlooked in engi-
neering” (Harrell 2013, 1). Crucially, systems he has built, such 
as Chimeria: Gatekeeper, confront users with the fluidity of racial 
identifications and the difficulties of managing discrimination 
based on stereotypes and the limitations of passing. Further, his 
analyses of existing systems and user interactions with his systems 
based on “archetypal analyses,” exposes and analyzes the “ideal 
players” embedded within popular games and how they can per-
petuate stereotypes through the actions they enable and prohibit. 
For instance, he reveals how certain “species” within games line up 
88 with certain stereotypical assumptions about races, as well as how 
user actions with differently gendered avatars reveal assumptions 
about gender.
Harrell’s work most critically engages the creativity embedded 
within artificial intelligence. Phantasmal Media: An Approach to 
Imagination, Computation, and Expression (2013), drawn from his 
work with Define Me and GRIOT, groundbreaking social networking 
and expressive A.I. projects, asks: can A.I. have the same impact 
as great literature, such as Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man? That is, 
through its powerful imagery and literary innovations, can A.I. 
enable its readers to experience the world of social invisibility? Can 
A.I. imagine different, more just worlds, while also exposing the 
extent to which society and ideology are linked to the imagination? 
To produce computational and interactive narratives that do this, 
Harrell in his first book developed a theory of phantasmal media, 
in which a phantasm is a combination of imagery and ideas. By 
focusing on the role of phantasms, Harrell addresses not simply 
the centrality of the imagination to individual experience but 
also the relationship between individuals and larger cultural and 
political issues. Significantly, Harrell does not simply condemn 
phantasms as unreal and unjust but rather reveals how they can 
be both empowering and oppressive. They are forms of agency 
play. Through a comparative analysis that reveals the experiences 
of those normally excluded from mainstream society, his work thus 
both exposes the negative impact of phantasms and produces new 
phantasms that allow his users to imagine new worlds. That is, his 
work in cultural computing makes visible cultural phantasms in 
order to diversify the range and impact of computing systems. For 
instance, by revealing the cultural phantasms behind notions of 
grey/black sheep (persons who do not fit nicely into preconceived 
identity and behavioral categorizations), Harrell transforms them 
from errors into rich sources of knowledge. As well (and as noted 
earlier), critical computing enables empowerment and agency, 
where agency is not the freedom to do anything one wants but 
rather the situated mechanisms for user action within the context 
89of cultural phantasms. By thinking expressive, cultural, and critical 
computing together, Harrell shows how embodied individual 
experiences are created and how the social and the computational 
are linked together through the phantasmal.
As well as this new type of artificial intelligence, new theories of 
connection— which do not presume a dangerously banal and 
reciprocal notion of friendship— are needed. Rather than similarity 
as breeding connection, we need to think, with Ahmed, through 
the generative power of discomfort. We need to queer homophily, 
a concept that should in its very nature be queer. Ahmed views 
queerness as an inability to be comfortable in certain norms:
To feel uncomfortable is precisely to be affected by that 
which persists in the shaping of bodies and lives. Discom-
fort is hence not about assimilation or resistance, but 
about inhabiting norms differently. The inhabitance is gen-
erative or productive insofar as it does not end with the 
failure of norms to be secured, but with the possibilities 
of living that do not “follow” those norms through. (em-
phasis in original, 155).
To be uncomfortable, then, is to inhabit norms differently, to create 
new ways of living with others— different ways of impressing upon 
others. Working with Ahmed and others, we can imagine new 
defaults, new forms of engagement. Different, more inhabitable, 
patterns.
We also need to examine theoretical moves and assumptions 
within the humanities. That the humanities and cultural theory 
more generally have moved away from questions of cultural differ-
ence and identity at a time when such an engagement could not 
be more crucial is mind- boggling. The various turns toward “less 
coarse” and “static” concepts such as nonhuman allure (themselves 
inspired by networks and new media), not to mention the embrace 
of an instrumentalist technological logic that demeans critical 
analysis and celebrates digital tinkering, are oddly contradictory 
and self- defeating. The early twenty- first century has witnessed a 
90 move away from theories of performativity, mutability, and deep 
interpretation, just when such theories are crucial to unpacking, re-
imagining and remaking the retrograde identity politics embedded 
within the world of networks. By refusing to analyze and engage 
these patterns— by refusing to use the “old” keys in our pocket— we 
lock ourselves into a future we allegedly oppose.
The future lies in the new patterns we can create together, new 
forms of relation that include liveable forms of indifference. The fu-
ture lies in unusual collaborations that both respect and challenge 
methods and insights, across disciplines and institutions.
Notes
 1 For an overview, see Sweeney and Haney 1992. During this same period, this 
was made clear in the disparity between jail sentences given to two U.S. male 
college athletes for sexually assaulting unconscious women. Corey Batey, a 
nineteen- year- old African American football player at Vanderbilt was sentenced 
to a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen to twenty- five years; Brock 
Turner, a nineteen- year- old swimmer at Stanford was sentenced to six months, 
which could be shortened for good behavior (see King 2016).
 2 These editors of Network Science made the following claims in their introduction 
to the inaugural issue:
Claim 1: Network science is the study of network models.
Claim 2: There are theories about network representations and network 
theories about phenomena: both constitute network theory.
Claim 3: Network science should be empirical— not exclusively so, 
but consistently— and its value assessed against alternative 
representations.
Claim 4: What sets network data apart is the incidence structure of its 
domain.
Claim 5: At the heart of network science is dependence, both between 
and within variables.
Claim 6: Network science is evolving into a mathematical science in its 
own right.
Claim 7: Network science is itself more of an evolving network than a 
paradigm expanding from a big bang. (Brandes et al. 2013, 1– 15)
 3 Barabási’s description resonates with cyberpunk fiction, which posits artificial 
intelligence and supreme cowboy hackers as capable of detecting “patterns . . . 
in the dance of the street” and thus foresee events that elude mere humans 
(see Gibson 1984, 250).
 4 As Duncan Watts notes: “The truth is that most of the actual science here com-
91prises extremely simple representations of extremely complicated phenomena. 
Starting off simple is an essential stage of understanding anything complex, 
and the results derived from simple models are often not only powerful but 
also deeply fascinating. By stripping away the confounding details of a compli-
cated world, by searching for the core of a problem, we can often learn things 
about connected systems that we would never guess from studying them 
directly. The cost is that the methods we use are often abstract, and the results 
are hard to apply directly to real applications. It is a necessary cost, unavoid-
able in fact, if we truly desire to make progress” (Watts 2004).
 5 The example they give of the difference between network science and statistic 
is quite illuminating: “While the range of attributes is structured, in much of 
science, the domain on which variables are defined is assumed to have no 
structure, i.e., simply a set. This may be for good reason. If we are interested in 
associations between, say, education and income controlled for age, we actual-
ly do not want there to be relations between individuals that also moderate the 
association. Much of statistics is in fact concerned with detecting and eliminat-
ing such relations. Network science, on the other hand, seeks to understand 
the correspondence and impact of these relations, rather than control for any 
variable” (Brandes et al. 2013, 8).
 6 As Easley and Kleinberg explain, “the pattern of connections in a given system 
can be represented as a network, the components of the system being the net-
work vertices and the connections the edges. Upon reflection it should come as 
no surprise (although in some fields it is a relatively recent realization) that the 
structure of such networks, the particular pattern of interactions, can have a 
big effect on the behavior of a system.  . . .  A network is a simplified represen-
tation that reduces a system to an abstract structure capturing only the basics 
of connection patterns and little else (Easley and Kleinberg 2010, 2).
 7 They write: “in a network setting, you should evaluate your actions not in 
isolation but with the expectation that the world will react to what you do.” This 
makes “cause- and- effect relationships . . . quite subtle” and may only become 
evident at the population level” (Easley and Kleinberg 2010, 5).
 8 Pierre Bourdieu defined social capital as: “the aggregate of the actual or poten-
tial resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or 
less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition— or 
in other words, to membership in a group” (Bourdieu 1986). Social capital is a 
form of credit or credentialing that relies on reciprocal and networked acknowl-
edgement and exchange. This form of capital, he stresses, exists “only in the 
practical state, in material and/or symbolic exchanges which help to maintain 
them.” The ties, that is, are dynamic and constantly enacted.
 9 As Cramer writes: “The reduction of audience members to countable 
numbers— data sets, indices— is thus a self- fulfilling prophecy of stability” 
(Cramer in this volume).
10 By 1977, homophily was already accepted as an axiomatic if problematic aspect 
of society. In an equally key early text, Inequality and Heterogeneity: A Primitive 
Theory of Social Structure, Peter Blau outlined what would become “contact 
92 theory”: the theory that contact creates integration. An ambitious attempt to 
create a roadmap of “macrosociological theory” (written in the spirit of Karl 
Marx and Georg Simmel), it argued for the importance of “weak ties” and 
heterogeneity to combat inequality within society. As he put it, heterogeneity 
and inequality were “complementary opposites” and “there can be too much 
inequality, but cannot be too much heterogeneity” (Blau 1977, 11). Blau ar-
gued strongly for the replacement of “strong ingroup bonds,” which “restrain 
individual freedom and mobility . . . and sustain rigidity and bigotry” with 
“diverse intergroup relations” (85). These heterogeneous relations, “though 
not intimate, foster tolerance, improve opportunities, and are essential for 
the integration of a large society” (85). In terms that resonated with Jameson’s 
description of postmodernism and the possibilities of “cognitive mapping,” he 
states, “the loss of extensive strong bonds in a community of kin and neighbors 
undoubtedly has robbed individuals of a deep sense of belonging and having 
roots, of profound feelings of security and lack of anxiety. This is the price 
we pay for the greater tolerance and opportunities that distinguish modern 
societies, with all their grievous faults, from primitive tribes and feudal orders. 
The social integration of individuals in modern society rests no longer exclu-
sively on strong bonds with particular ingroups but in good part on multiple 
supports from wider networks of weaker social ties, supplemented by a few 
intimate bonds” (85). This insight itself draws from the work of another early 
progenitor of network science, Mark Granovetter’s 1973 theorization of “weak 
ties” as essential to information dissemination and success. For more on this 
in relation to networks as dissolving postmodern confusion, see Chun (2016). 
Tellingly, Blau’s argument assumes— and indeed takes as axiomatic— the fact 
that ingroup interactions are greater than intergroup ones (Axiom A1.1). It also 
divides and identifies individuals based on structural parameters, such as “age, 
race, education, and socioeconomic status,” some of which Blau considers 
“inborn” (1977, 6).
11 For instance, Lenore Newman and Ann Dalez state: “We feel more comfortable 
with those like ourselves, even in virtual communities.” (2007, 79– 90).
12 In 1972, the NAACP filed a class action lawsuit against the Boston School 
Committee— Bostong is contiguous with Cambridge, Massachusetts, which is 
where Harvard is located.
13 Schelling writes: “economists are familiar with systems that lead to aggregate 
results that the individual neither intends nor needs to be aware of, results 
that sometimes have no recognizable counterpart at the level of the individual. 
The creation of money by a commercial banking system is one; the way savings 
decisions cause depressions or inflations is another. Similarly, biological evo-
lution is responsible for a lot of sorting and separating, but the little creatures 
that mate and reproduce and forage for food would be amazed to know that 
they were bringing about separation of species, territorial sorting, or the extinc-
tion of species” (Schelling 1971, 145). Schelling also uses the term “incentives” 
to explain segregation: from preferences to avoidance to economic constraints 
(148).
9314 At the start of this article, Schelling explains: “This article is about the kinds of 
segregation— or separation, or sorting— that can result from discriminatory 
individual behavior. By ‘discriminatory,’ I mean reflecting an awareness, con-
scious or unconscious, of sex or age or religion or color or whatever the basis 
of segregation is, an awareness that influences decisions on where to live, 
whom to sit by, what occupation to join or avoid, whom to play with or whom 
to talk to” (144).
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Data Paranoia: How to 
Make Sense of Pattern 
Discrimination
Clemens Apprich
When I want to communicate with another person, I have at hand 
a number of old and new methods: languages, systems of writing, 
means of storing, of transmitting, or of multiplying the message— 
tapes, telephone, printing press, and so on.        
— Michel Serres, Hermes
In Michel Serres’s Hermes (1982) we follow the mythical journey of 
the Greek god, whose goal it is to deliver a message to different 
protagonists of European cultural history. During this journey the 
message gets translated, transformed, and multiplied through 
diverse means of communication and spaces of knowledge, 
reaching from mythology to science, from philosophy to literature, 
from mathematics to biology, thermodynamics, and cybernetics. 
These fields constitute the nodal points of a global network of 
communication, which Hermes constantly weaves into a fabric of 
circular codes. Hence, the namegiver of modern Hermeneutics is the 
divine herald of all communication. But at the same time, and this 
is Serres’s punchline, he is a parasite of communication, a trickster, 
100 who subverts the symbolic order he builds in the first place. Similar 
to the figure of the hacker (see Pias 2002), he has to disassemble 
the code before he can reassemble it. Hermes, in this sense, 
causes disorder, interference, and confusion, the background noise 
against which the meaning of a message can only take shape (see 
Harari and Bell 1982, xxv). However, this noise must be excluded in 
order to maintain the illusion of frictionless communication.
According to Serres, in communication a smooth transfer is not the 
norm but rather the exception. Misunderstanding and divergent 
interpretations are an integral part of the symbolic order. So even 
if we misunderstand a certain situation, there is an attempt to 
catch its meaning. It is always a common meaning and symbolic 
order that our understanding is referring to. Without this common 
meaning there is no understanding. Understanding, therefore, 
necessitates an intersubjectively produced meaning; it implies a 
collective principle of comprehension, assuming that this principle 
is always about to fail. From this perspective, hermeneutics is 
not only the methodology of interpretation but also the general 
theory of understanding (see Schleiermacher 1998). It does refer 
to reproductive comprehension, understood as interpretation of 
a pregiven symbolic system, as well as productive understanding, 
which implies an attribution of meaning. In particular, the latter 
is of importance for the book at hand, because it relates to an 
authoritative— although not necessarily authoritarian— entity, a 
master signifier organizing meaning. Hence, even though— or pre-
cisely because— there is no necessary analogy between reality and 
its symbolization, meaning is attributed to the world by a symbolic 
order, which, ultimately, functions as an ideological system (see 
Žižek 2008, 95– 97).1
Big Data, it seems, proceeds to become a new ideology with its very 
own horizon of meaning. As Florian Cramer suggests in his contri-
bution to this book, hermeneutics therefore has enjoyed a revival 
with Big Data analytics, even though it now has to be considered a 
“backdoor hermeneutics.” In times of the so- called fourth paradigm 
(see Hey, Tansley, and Tolle 2009),2 data- intensive computing yields 
101a new form of analysis that is no longer about the interpretation 
of the past but rather focuses on speculating about the future. 
However, far from being a neutral tool for capturing, curating, and 
analyzing, Big Data is based on its very own interpretative frame-
work: “Just like the Oracle of Delphi, it is dependent on interpre-
tation” (see Cramer in this volume). And according to Cramer, this 
“interpretative capability is limited by algorithmics— so that the 
limitations of the tool (and, ultimately, of using mathematics to pro-
cess meaning) end up defining the limits of interpretation.” Herein 
lies the whole problem with data analytics analyzed in this volume: 
the process of understanding something as something— the 
formal structure of any understanding and thus of hermeneutics— 
disappears into a nirvana of algorithmic computation, which is no 
longer intelligible to the human mind.3
Yet one could ask if the disappearance of this process isn’t an 
integral part of communication itself? At least this is Serres’s point 
when he questions modern information theory, which, for him, 
is only one particular case within the problem of communication 
(Serres 1982, 71– 83). For Serres the problem is not so much about 
how to encode or decode a message; that is, to know the code. 
Rather the problem lies in the fact that for a communicative act to 
be successful, the underlying code has to be hidden. This becomes 
apparent when we think about dominant meanings in the cultural, 
social, and political world, which are necessary preconditions if 
we want to make sense of— or even critique— everyday life (see 
Hall 1999). In order to be part of it, one has to speak and under-
stand the common language, without referring to it all the time.4 
This taken- for- granted knowledge constitutes an organizational 
principle of understanding, a master signifier, to which both the 
psychic and social individual are subjected. Hence, Hermes does 
not simply deliver the messages of the gods, which then have to be 
interpreted. Being a god himself, he represents the system of sym-
bols within which a common reality is constructed and therefore 
communication can take place. Hermes is messenger, translator, 
and authoritative figure in one. And as god of disguise, he is aware 
102 of the fact that successful communication requires his exclusion 
as mediator (Serres 1982, 67). Such an awareness also depicts the 
challenge of this book: neither does it want to repeat the pervasive 
belief that algorithms are just too complex to be understood, nor 
take the bait that by simply making every communication step 
transparent, the problem can be solved.
In order to filter a message out of noise, to literally discriminate 
data to extract information, the discriminatory patterns within the 
communication process have to work behind the scene. This is the 
hermeneutical paradox and the reason Michel Serres considers 
Hermes to be the patron saint of our postmodern time. As soon 
as Hermes enters the stage to deliver the message, he blurs and 
renders it unintelligible; only after he disappears does the message 
become legible. He is the excluded third in every communication 
process, like algorithms, which are present and absent at the same 
time. With new information and communication technologies, we 
live in a time of such paradoxes, often compared to the passage 
from oral to written culture (see Stiegler 2012) or from writing to 
printing (see Builder 1993). As a consequence, the cultural logic 
of late capitalism is entangled into a postmodern confusion (see 
Jameson 1991), propelled by a “decline of symbolic efficiency” 
(Dean 2010, 6)5. The symbolic order resembles a flip- flop picture: 
Like Hermes, it constantly changes its state, leaving us in the 
dark about its actual meaning. But as can be seen from Hermes’s 
journey, pictured by Serres as a succession of random encounters 
and discoveries, every disconnection entails a reconnection; the 
interruption of a symbolic order of exchange allows for the produc-
tion of a new, more complex order (see Serres 1982).
Connecting People Apart
In times of global connectedness, the symbolic order we live in gets 
more and more complicated. As Wendy Hui Kyong Chun argues 
in her piece in this volume, we have to critically engage with this 
order, rather than simply dismiss it as the latest hype of capitalist 
103innovation. According to her, we need to work through the prob-
lems posed by network analytics, in particular its excessive search 
for correlations: “If almost anything can be shown to be real (if 
almost any correlation can be discovered), how do we know what 
matters, what is true?” In our networked environments, network 
analytics has become the default model, on the basis of which 
causality gets replaced by data correlation. We live in a flat ontolo-
gy of likeness and similarity, within which every fact is correlated to 
another fact, with the effect that no fact is of significance anymore 
(see Lynch 2016). Yet this analysis is far from new; Friedrich Ni-
etzsche already came up with the idea of a postfact world, where 
there are no facts but only interpretations (see Nietzsche 1989). 
What is new, though, is the fragmentation of largely stable knowl-
edge sources into an atomized world of updates, comments, opin-
ions, rumors, and gossip. In order to be able to filter information 
from this constant stream of data, we rely on algorithms, helping 
us to bring order into our new media life. In this sense, Facebook, 
Google, and company create a habitual environment, a seemingly 
personalized world, which keeps us in a state of self- identification 
through social segregation (see Chun 2016).
The salient point of Chun’s text is the conclusion that these isolated 
worlds, also called echo chambers or filter bubbles, are not simply 
manifestations of a “natural” preference of individuals to bond 
with similar individuals, but have to be constantly produced and 
reproduced. Hence, behind the concept of homophily the “old” 
power relations of class, race, and gender flare up. But instead of 
“new theories of connections” (Chun in this volume), in order to cut 
through the ideological linkage of Big Data and network analytics, 
we are confronted with “the end of theory” (see Anderson 2008), 
a claim that is deeply problematic, because it tends to obfuscate 
what is crucially needed: a critical knowledge about the (sexist, 
racist, classist) mechanisms underlying today’s networked sociality. 
This not only affects the technological aspect of pattern discrimina-
tion but also our very understanding of democracy. If data speaks 
for itself, an informed debate about how and for whom it works 
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of a positive or negative interpretation of existing normative 
symbols, gets replaced by free- floating cosmographies, under- 
stood as attempts to map the world without a common point  
of reference.
In the digital world a new “hermeneutics of suspicion” (Ricoeur 
1970, 32) vis- à- vis media technologies is necessary.6 As Boris Groys 
has argued, such a “media- ontological suspicion” isn’t simply a 
subjective illusion, arising in the imaginary of an individual, but 
an objective phenomenon, which appears during the act of media 
observation itself: “As observers of the media, we are simply 
incapable of seeing anything else in the media but loci of hidden 
manipulation” (Groys 2012, 38). The paranoid doubt, according to 
Groys, cannot be suspended, because the submedial space— that 
is, the space lurking behind the symbolic surface of media— is 
structurally hidden. As is the case with the divine dis/appearance 
of Hermes, “we have no choice but to suspect, to project, and to 
insinuate” (38). Hence, we inevitably assume manipulation behind 
the media, which remains a dark space to us; and still we build 
upon the reality constituted by it. For Niklas Luhmann this is one 
of the paradox effects of the functional differentiation of modern 
society: “Whatever we know about our society, or indeed about the 
world in which we live, we know through the mass media. . . .  
On the other hand, we know so much about the mass media that 
we are not able to trust these sources” (Luhmann 2000, 1). Yet 
Luhmann is still assuming that there is only one reality construct-
ed by mass media, while today, with the emergence of digital 
media, we have to consider a variety of realities in different media 
settings, which makes the media- ontological question even more 
complicated.
Due to the diversity of media formats and offerings supported by 
the internet, the “construction of reality” (Luhmann 2000, 76) has 
been dispersed into a network of simultaneously existing realities. 
While mass media, with its basic principles of periodicity, publicity, 
universality, and topicality, has established a common public 
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able to participate in rational deliberation (see Habermas 1989, 
244– 48), the actual realization of participatory media in the form 
of social media has led to a fragmentation of a mass- mediated 
public into partial publics (see Hagen 2016). This shift from mass 
media to social media is accompanied by the rise of web- based 
communication applications, the ubiquity of mobile computing and 
the formation of powerful media platforms, all of which are deeply 
enmeshed with our everyday media life (see van Dijck and Poell 
2013). According to José van Dijck and Thomas Poell, social media 
is characterized by four principles, which, over the past years, have 
gradually infiltrated the logic of mass media: programmability, 
popularity, connectivity, and datafication. The latter in particular 
can be seen as a crucial aspect of a data- driven world, because it 
“refers to the ability of networked platforms to render into data 
many aspects of the world that have never been quantified before” 
(9). Real- time data flows, unprecedented in their volume and 
constantly collected, provide the commercial basis of a whole new 
industry, which tries both to predict and shape the behavior of 
users, and, as a consequence, redefine our understanding of par-
ticipation: in the interplay between how things are and how they 
might be (see Beyes and Pias 2016), a data- driven world becomes a 
malleable compound that can yield very different results.
With Big Data and social media platforms the public sphere gets 
more and more fragmented (see Varnelis 2008).7 For instance, in 
the last couple of years political news and advocacy pages have 
sprung up on platforms like Facebook (see Herrman 2016). What is 
unique about these media outlets is the fact that they do not exist 
outside of social media sites, but nevertheless attract a significant 
audience. They are based on algorithms, which filter and sort the 
content “to show people what is most relevant to them” (Adamic, 
Bakshy, and Messing 2015). Here the homophilic mechanism 
shows through, because the content, which is aggregated from 
a multiplicity of sources, is sifted according to the preferences of 
the user— or at least according to what the algorithm thinks these 
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mass media logic, is being subverted: instead of bringing everyone 
up- to- date with the same information, different stories circulate in 
different parts of the network, and by sharing them in peer groups, 
existing opinions get confirmed, while deviant opinions are filtered 
out. Such a confirmation bias, well known in psychology, has 
profound implications for a common space of reference:
While it may seem that the decline of symbolic efficiency 
ushers in a new era of freedom from rigid norms and 
expectations, the fluidity and adaptability of imaginary 
identities are accompanied by fragility and insecurity. 
Imaginary identities are incapable of establishing a firm 
place to stand, a position from which one can make sense 
of one’s experiences, one’s worlds. (Dean 2010, 57)
As Jodi Dean points out, to pin down meaning is getting more and 
more difficult with social media, where the truth becomes a matter 
of perception, rather than the result of intersubjectively agreed- 
upon facts.
The internet has created a new desire for participation, but other 
than the participatory hopes of the 1990s, the will to participate 
doesn’t seem to yield a common space of reference anymore. In a 
world in which every opinion can be expressed, paranoia pene-
trates almost all aspects of our lives, which, in turn, has dramatic 
effects on the understanding of a participatory public sphere (see 
Chun 2006). The result can be seen in recent political debates, 
where exaggeration, suspicion, and conspiratorial fantasies 
continuously spill over into the discourse: if I lose, the elections 
are rigged; only the polls in my favor are trustworthy; all the 
others are part of a conspiracy against me. This reemergence of a 
“paranoid style in politics” (see Hofstadter 1964) is possible due to 
the aforementioned postfact situation. And even if such a situation 
was already immanent in European fascism at the beginning of the 
twentieth century or the McCarthy- era in the United States, it is 
gaining significant momentum at a time when data simply outnum-
107bers facts. Hence, the paranoid trait gets propelled by the fact that 
there are no facts, or, to be more precise, only factitious facts.
Data– Information– Knowledge
In modern times, democratic debate has been dependent on so- 
called expert knowledge, although it has always been clear that 
such knowledge is itself dependent on the actual public opinion 
of a given time. In this sense, the symbolic order prestructures 
the condition of possibility of what can and cannot be expressed, 
which, in retrospect, stabilizes the very same order. Even fascism 
tried to enshrine its grotesque and death- dealing laws in a fact- 
based scientific discourse, not only to prove its alleged superiority 
but also to justify its crimes. The dispute over what counts as a fact 
and what does not was at the very core of modern “games of truth” 
(see Foucault 1984, 386– 88). Today, by contrast, the effort to main-
tain at least a pretense of truth, which is based on facts, seems no 
longer to be of importance. As can be seen with recent events, such 
as the Brexit, Trumpism, and the notorious and tiring prevarication 
of the European far right, to tell a lie, and being caught doing so, is 
no longer a cause for embarrassment. It seems that white men’s 
discourse does not rely on expertise, however botchy it might be, 
in order to insist on being right. All that is needed is some poorly 
researched information: £350m supposedly sent to the EU every 
week by Downing Street, increasing crime rates caused by refugees 
in the United States and Germany alike— all of these are simple 
lies, but do not stain the reputations of those who tell them. On 
the contrary, they may not speak the truth but are nonetheless 
beloved by a significant part of the population who sympathize 
with their authoritarian view; even more so, because they are 
believed to stand their ground against all those academic wiseacres 
and pundits.
If hermeneutics is considered to be the art of differentiation be-
tween bullshit and facts, then the question arises as to why it is not 
central to the exercise of power anymore? Why can we endlessly 
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to care? This is the implicit question of Hito Steyerl’s contribution 
in this volume. She explains how “probability enters truth produc-
tion on an extensive scale” (Steyerl in this volume). Rather than 
facts, which need to be verified by some sort of institution, data, 
which is endlessly processed and filtered, constitutes the basis of 
truthfulness today; with the effect “that the patterns supposed to 
be uncovered in massive data correspond to some degree with the 
patterns that are already assumed to be found there” (Steyerl). In 
other words: what we are looking for is not so much veracity, built 
on traditional inquiry and reasoning, but opinions and beliefs that 
fit into our world views. As a consequence, the age of facts and 
truth finding is being replaced by a new era, characterized by a 
permissive and incessant interpretation of data (see Lepore 2016).8
Of course, one could ask, why bother with the truth anyway? 
Wasn’t it the intrinsic goal of postmodern critique to get rid of or at 
least destabilize the grand narratives of modernity? Why becoming 
sissy, when Trump, Le Pen, or Strache are mocking the mainstream 
opinion of being biased itself? Well, because a common under-
standing of what is true, and what is not true, is important for 
the constitution of an objective reality, that is, a reality based on 
intersubjectively negotiated norms and rules. If such an agreement 
is annulled or simply ignored, society as a whole runs the risk of 
becoming cynical about its own truth and therefore existence. 
Again, none of this is new.9 However, with the rise of Big Data, we 
have reached a new qualitative step of soothsaying. The constant 
growth of data makes the idea of evidence- based politics appear 
outdated, because data, by definition, can be interpreted in this 
or that way. There is no major event that isn’t entangled in a 
web of assertions and objections. No news not chopped up and 
distributed via social media channels, to the effect that a common 
space of cultural, social, and political reference is being rendered 
impossible. Due to this process, accelerated by personalized and 
personalizing algorithms, we risk missing the big picture for our 
small echo chambers filled with personal data (see Pariser 2012).
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the implications of pattern recognition. In order to distinguish 
signal from noise, people always relied on specific patterns. In this 
context, racist and sexist algorithmic cultures are not so different 
from Ancient Greece, when women and slaves were barred— or 
should we say, filtered— from the public discourse. Their voices 
were not heard, because they did not apply to the specific set 
of values in the Greek polis. They may have been quantitatively 
significant, but they were not qualitatively relevant. Data, in the 
sense of a given thing (lat. datum), needs to be processed, in order 
to obtain meaning. Or, more simply, it needs to be put into form 
(lat. informare). Hence, a deliberate act is required, whereby data is 
applied to a preexisting scheme or pattern.10 And this process, as 
Hito Steyerl points out in this volume, is a “fundamentally political 
operation.” By applying filters, we constantly (re- )create them, 
particularly since the act of filtering information from data lies at 
the very heart of how we create our world.
Put into psychoanalytical and, in particular, Lacanian terms, one 
could say that unfiltered data represents the real, the absolute 
unknowable, whereas information stands for reality, rendered 
intelligible by our cognitive filters. Reality, in turn, can be seen as 
a composite of the imaginary and the symbolic, the two registers 
responsible for the constitution of our self.11 Thus, looking at the 
example of Google’s Deep Dream Generator from Steyerl’s text, we 
can see how the algorithmic training of an artificial neural net-
work, which is constituted by a large amount of data, ends up by 
overidentifying with its own training set. Like humans are haunted 
by the demons of the past in their dreams, the algorithms, while 
trying to filter intelligible information from the noise of the deep 
web, simply repeat the imaginary they were fed with. “But”— and 
this is crucial in Steyerl’s analysis— “in a very materialist sense, 
these entities are far from hallucinations. If they are dreams, those 
dreams can be interpreted as condensations or displacements 
of the current technological disposition.” What we see in the 
phantasmagoric creatures is what Google offers us: its unleashed 
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are not only fetishes but dreamed- up, franchised chimeras” (Stey-
erl). The produced signals are not just some dreamed- up images 
but representations of our current techno- capitalist system.
Now the crux of the matter is that dreams are not facts, and that 
Google is not (yet) equivalent to our reality. In fact, the latter is not 
only constituted by the imaginary but also by the symbolic. A tech 
company may be very influential when it comes to the imagination 
of our future, but it is only one player, albeit a powerful one, in 
the social deliberation of intersubjectively accepted patterns and 
codes. This leads us to knowledge as a third layer of analysis: in 
addition to data and information,12 knowledge can be seen as an 
agreed- upon framework for evaluating experiences and informa-
tion. Take the example of the weather forecast: the measuring 
instruments of a meteorological station produce data in the form 
of discrete units. This array of figures, let’s say numbers from 0 to 
9, only becomes legible when being applied to a specific scheme 
like the Celsius scale, a task normally done by experts. But in 
order to both make sense to the public and be accepted by it, this 
information has to be presented within a context that pins down 
meaning and gives it relevance. This is why people across the globe 
still watch the weather forecast every evening at a given time, or 
consult their most trusted app to show them the predicted tem-
perature for the next day. This shared symbolic realm is necessary 
for information to be considered reliable.13
While hallucinations take place at the imaginary level, and thus are 
only accessible to the individual, delusions refer to the symbolic, 
in which we rely on agreed- upon norms and values. This is why a 
distortion of reality can also happen collectively, in the sense that 
a social group deviates from common sense and its understanding 
of what is true and what is false. As theories of radical democracy 
have shown, these deviations are even intrinsic to the political pro-
cess, because social reality is always in the making (see Laclau and 
Mouffe 2001). By the same token, we can never be sure whether 
the reality we live in isn’t delusional itself. There are no generaliz-
111able criteria to determine its veracity, because every time we try, 
we are thrown back to reality. Conversely, to call another symbolic 
order delusional is only possible based on the prerequisite of 
an already established order, from which the alleged delusion is 
distinguished (see Foucault 1988). So our collectively agreed- upon 
reality provides us with a set of beliefs, ideas, and norms, which 
serve as a point of reference.
In accordance with Michel Serres’s idea of the excluded third, this 
common sense needs to be hidden in order to be effective. An 
essential part of hegemonic power, therefore, entails the ability to 
render deviant visions of the world impossible, while presenting 
the “real world” as the only possible one. This, in particular, is true 
about tech companies, whose imaginary is deeply rooted in the 
idea that their products are created to improve the world and our 
lives. Yet, what they do come up with are cock- and- bull stories, 
which, with the aid of massive advertising budgets, are sold to the 
public in order to become part of our everyday version of reality. 
Think about cloud computing, for example. The idea that some 
cloud is a trustworthy place for all our data, from holiday pics to 
our health information to our secret desires and wishes, is not 
only puzzling but profoundly problematic. And still, we use cloud 
storage services, even if we should and actually do know better. “I 
think conspiracy and paranoia are just what the cloud needs,” ex-
plains Tung- Hui Hu, the author of A Prehistory of the Cloud, because 
“the system works like a massive pyramid scheme— we all need 
to believe that it’s everywhere in order for it to be everywhere” 
(Sutcliffe 2015). This delusional drive lies at the very root of digital 
cultures and how they have unfolded over the last decades.
Pattern Recognition
In a review of William Gibson’s 2003 novel Pattern Recognition, Fred-
ric Jameson calls the collective unconscious of global consumerism 
the “eBay Imaginary” (see Jameson 2003), a notion that, fifteen 
years later, can be extended to Apple, Amazon, Facebook, Google, 
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constitute the backbone of today’s platform capitalism but are also 
at the forefront of predicting our techno- cultural future. In fact, 
the ability to identify potential trends from vast amounts of data, 
or, even better, to create them in the first place, has become the 
lifeline of capitalist production, with the effect that companies are 
contingent on new modes of pattern recognition that allow them to 
read the future. Now for Jameson, the breathtaking development 
in information and communication technologies refers to the 
most recent push for modernization, best represented by Gibson’s 
“high- tech paranoia,” in which “the circuits and networks of some 
putative global computer hookup are narratively mobilized by 
labyrinthine conspiracies of autonomous but deadly interlocking 
and competing information agencies in a complexity often beyond 
the capacity of the normal reading mind” (Jameson 1991, 38). In 
the postmodern world, the individual gets lost in the hyper- space 
of computer networks. Not only does she lose her ability to locate 
herself within this space, but she is also dispersed into a myriad 
of datasets.
While Jameson associates cyberpunk’s “high- tech paranoia” with 
individual anxiety, social conspiracies, and the annihilation of the 
self, which is the pathological sediment of postmodern society, 
others have stressed the liberating effects arising from a destabi-
lization of the modern subject and its totalizing master narratives 
(see Lyotard 1979; Deleuze and Guattari 1983; Vattimo 1988; 
Holmes 2009). In particular, Félix Guattari calls for new “collective 
assemblages of enunciation” (Guattari 1996, 263) in order to over-
come the normative subjectivity of mass- mediated publics.14 This 
pluralistic approach not only challenges the idea of the individual 
in its singularity but was indeed seen as an immanent process 
of becoming a collective, which itself should be experienced as a 
process of greater freedom. In our “post- media era” (see Guattari 
2013), the collective appropriation and use of media technologies 
by a multitude of “subject- groups” (Guattari 2000, 60) nourished 
the hopes that new modes of subjectivation would emerge, 
able to break through the mind- numbing effects of mass media. 
113However, the deconstruction of mass- mediated subjectivity poses 
the aforementioned problem that a common space of reference, 
within which you can agree or disagree, is increasingly difficult 
to maintain.
The transition from mass media to social media corresponds with 
Guattari’s prospect of post- (mass)mediality. The desired liberation 
and multiplication of the subject has lead to a new imaginary of 
participation. But other than the hoped- for resingularization— 
that is the ability of individuals to collectively remap their 
world— Info- capitalism has managed to retain the old model of 
exploitation by adjusting it to the new conditions of data produc-
tion. Instead of a common vision that “designates an investment 
of attention, libidinal energy, and time,” what “happens today on 
Facebook, Twitter, and the like, is the reverse, which in spite of 
being the virtual home of a truly massive ensemble of humans, 
never form a collective project of ‘being- together’ ” (Hui and Halpin 
2013, 107). In social media, the individual gets atomized, in order 
to become a source of data production, as well as an identifiable 
subject for marketing. This form of algorithmic governance is well 
known by now. However, most of today’s critical examination is 
simply repeating the implicit presuppositions of the problem, 
that is that the individual has to be preserved, rather than asking 
for new forms of individuation in our postmedia time. Such an 
approach doesn’t necessarily imply an affirmation of the status 
quo; on the contrary, it could help to set up some criteria to better 
understand, and maybe even vanquish the paranoid anxiety 
caused by “postmodern confusion” (see Chun 2015).
There is, of course, no clear- cut definition of what paranoia 
actually is. In its colloquial use, the term often gets confused with 
delusional disorder in the broader sense of the word (see Jaspers 
1997) or the rather clinical schizophrenia (see Bleuler 1912). 
However, if we want to understand some of the specific aspects 
of paranoia, we can start with its etymology: The word paranoia is 
a composition of the Greek words παρά (para), meaning “beside, 
next,” and νόος (noos), that is “mind”; so paranoia literally trans-
lates into “being next to your mind.” This seems to be consistent, 
114 given that the term is still used to describe a mental state of 
delusional or “false” belief regarding the self or persons or objects 
outside the self that is maintained despite indisputable evidence 
to the contrary.15 In this sense, paranoia can be seen as a partial, 
subordinate aspect of a delusion disorder; were it not for the fact 
that the French word for delusion, délire, stems from the Latin 
word delirium, which means “to go off the furrow” and, therefore, is 
almost equivalent with paranoia in the sense of “being deranged or 
distorted.”16 Even more, the German word Wahn or wähnen, which 
descends from the Indo- European wen, has the same root as in “to 
win,” and can be taken to mean “to imagine” and “to believe,” but 
also “to search,” “to strive,” or “to hope for something.” This is a 
crucial point in defining the delusional trait, in particular because it 
refers to a productive, if not salutary and reparative aspect in what 
we usually dismiss as paranoia disorder.17
Paranoia as a specific way of knowing things is, along these 
lines, not so much caused by a lack of information as by an 
overproduction of meaning.18 Following the canonic description 
by German neurologist and psychiatrist Klaus Conrad, we can 
define a delusional episode on the basis of— at least— three stages 
(see Conrad 1958):19 First, there is the trema (Wahnstimmung), a 
delusional atmosphere, comparable to stage fright. You know that 
something is going on, but you cannot figure out what it is. This 
mental condition is associated with the sensation of suspicious-
ness, alienation, and fear, but also an anticipatory excitement. 
Second, the moment of revelation, termed apophenia (Wahn-
wahrnehmung), when things start to make sense again. Apophenia 
is described here as the spontaneous perception of connections 
and meaningfulness, accompanied by a triumphant sentiment of 
having discovered something of tremendous significance. Such an 
Aha! moment is central to the paranoid perception of the world. 
And third, anastrophe (Wahneinfall), that is the delusional state of 
irreversible reference. Not only do things make sense to me, but 
they also begin to revolve around myself. Pathologically speaking, 
this is the point of no return, a “Copernican revolution” (Conrad), 
115after which the delusional idea becomes solid and incorrigible. 
Put into an even more simple model, we can speak of only two 
stages in the development of a delusion disorder: first the collapse 
of a central symbolic order, triggering the delusional sensation of 
the trema; and then the attempt to restore such an order by the 
discovery and, ultimately, ossification of a delusional idea, which 
helps to reconstitute the world (Kupke 2012, 116). In fact, the par-
anoid desire can be seen as a self- healing mechanism, a protective 
function to reappropriate the world.
It is not by chance that in cultural history and theory, media tech-
nologies often pop up as objects of desire of delusional systems: 
from telegraphy, to radio, to the internet (see Kittler 1984; Stingelin 
1989; Chun 2006). Human cognition has always been embedded in 
media- technological environments, but it is with the rise of digital 
media that the need to develop a systematic understanding of our 
technologically modulated environments has become vital (see 
Hörl 2015). The concept of paranoia can be a useful tool in this con-
text, because it helps to uncover societal beliefs, which have to be 
hidden, in order to function properly.20 The paranoid person draws 
on the same beliefs, with the significant difference being that he 
or she overaffirms, and, thereby, reveals them. Hence, the irony 
behind pattern recognition algorithms like Google’s Deep Dream 
Generator, analyzed by Hito Steyerl in this volume. It is a perfect 
example of an artificial neural network, which, by overidentifying 
with its own training set, becomes paranoid and, in doing so, gives 
us an insight into its inner functioning. What should be hidden 
behind the colorful curtain of Google’s marketing department, 
unintentionally enters the stage, and what we see there is merely 
the fact that all the high- tech gimmicks are ultimately a reflection of 
techno- capitalism itself (see Steyerl).
Paranoid Thinking Machine
Germany, fall 2018: Three years after Angela Merkel’s world- 
famous “We will manage,” regarding Europe’s so- called refugee 
116 crisis, the initial welcome culture has turned into a refusal culture. 
With the entry of the openly xenophobic and not- so- hidden racist 
Alternative for Germany (AfD) into the Bundestag, the political 
debate in Germany has become harsher, setting the tone for an 
unprecedented explosion of hate speech in social media, and, 
even worse, legitimizing physical violence and terrorist attacks 
against refugees.21 What we are witnessing here are symptoms of 
a political crisis, namely the erosion of solidarity in society. Hate 
speech, therefore, needs to be seen as an alarming sign for the 
disintegration of a common public sphere, which, until now, served 
as the minimal framework for social negotiation processes. The 
inflammatory term “Lügenpresse” (lying press), popular among 
reactionary right- wing groups, points to a rupture in the political 
discourse: even if modern mass media (press, radio, TV) were 
always suspected of manipulating the public, their function as a 
general framework of reference, manipulative or not, was largely 
undisputed. With digital media, by contrast, we find ourselves in an 
imaginary of participation, in a world of images and affects, which 
leads to a dispersion of a common ground.22
Today’s oppositional politics, in particular of the far right, is not 
so much concerned with the creation of a counterpublic, which 
sets itself to correct the reality produced by mainstream media, 
but rather with the creation of its own media and, therefore, its 
own truth. Blogs, online magazines and Facebook sites of right- 
wing populists in Europe, but also the alt- right movement in the 
United States, are manifestations of the aforementioned transition 
from mass media to social media logic. The deadly force of this 
transformation results from the fact that every withdrawal, total 
or partial, from the collectively shared realm of the social world 
triggers the collapse of the symbolic, which, in turn, leads to a 
further drifting apart of this world. However, the question remains 
whether this is simply a relentless demise, or if we need to develop 
“new attentional forms that pursue in a different manner the 
process of psychic and collective individuation” (Stiegler 2012). To 
break from the echo chambers of personalized data, we need to 
117deploy the paranoid moment: while today’s everyday media life is 
characterized by an excess of truth claiming, with the effect that 
the individual is caught in his or her own network, paranoia in its 
productive and salutary effects, may provide a stencil to redraw a 
symbolic order in our postmedia world.
A paranoid thinking machine, understood as a theoretical con-
cept,23 tries to compensate the symbolic void by filling it with 
meaning. The fact that these compensation efforts are currently 
characterized by hate speech reinforces the assumption that we 
are dealing with a social crisis of de- solidarization. But what if such 
a machine is put to different ends? What has to be done to switch 
the mode from hate to love? As Kübra Gümüşay reminded us at 
re:publica in May 2016, the hate against minorities in social media 
is highly organized, and, therefore, the only way to counter it is to 
organize love as well. This may sound naive but in fact points to the 
heart of what participation is all about: it is not only the act or state 
of having part of something, in order to be able to express your 
opinion, but also of sharing something in common, of becoming 
“an instance of a collective, not just one individual among others, 
but the very thing itself” (Kelty 2016, 236). This is why a debate 
about the reconstitution of a common symbolic order is so crucial; 
neither as a return to mass- media, nor as a “final” solution, but 
rather as a constant revision of the (post- )modern paradox that in-
dividuals are solicited by a collective will to share, and, by the same 
token, are thrown back into segregation.24 As long as this debate 
isn’t taking place, antiharassment tools, such as the ones recently 
introduced by Twitter and Instagram, can provide a first remedy 
to filter out the noise of racist and sexist slurs. And initiatives like 
TrollBusters, a platform to analyze and map how networks of 
harassers operate, are a good tactical means to fight back against 
hate speech. But in the long run, what we need is a strategy to 
reorganize our sociotechnical world, so that everyone feels free 
and safe to express him- and, in particular, herself.
In order to achieve this goal, or at least advance toward it, media, 
artistic, and cultural practices can be used to reflect on but also 
118 test the reconstitution of a common space of reference. While the 
imaginary of the digital is still caught in the neo- feudal ideology 
of platform capitalism, with its belief in individualist consumerism 
and reductive identity politics, only collective practices promise 
the creation of new attentional forms, which, in turn, could help 
to reassemble the paranoid thinking machine. This is not to claim 
that we can get rid of discrimination by simply invoking creative 
forms of enunciation. As has been argued throughout this book, 
pattern discrimination— that is, the ability to filter information from 
data— is an essential part of human, but also nonhuman, cognition. 
However, what is at stake is the question of how and to what 
extent these patterns are themselves built on racist, sexist, and 
classist beliefs? Such a critical approach is sensible of the fact that 
the technological world functions as the excluded third, a world, 
which builds the basis for an increasing number of decision- making 
processes, and, therefore, needs to be brought into social and 
political awareness.
Notes
 1 Slavoj Žižek refers to the concept of radical democracy (see Laclau and Mouffe 
2001), in order to answer the “crucial question of the theory of ideology: the 
multitude of ‘floating signifiers,’ of protoideological elements, is structured into 
a unified field through the intervention of a certain ‘nodal point’ (the Lacanian 
point de capiton) which ‘quilts’ them, stops their sliding and fixes their meaning” 
(Žižek 2008, 95).
 2 After the first three paradigms in scientific research, which were experimental, 
theoretical, and computational, the fourth paradigm indicates the analysis of 
massive data sets.
 3 This adds another narcissistic wound to the human subject: After Copernicus’s 
death blow to heliocentric cosmology, Darwin’s dethroning of the human being, 
and Freud’s subversion of the thinking subject, Big Data wrests the communica-
tion process from an anthropocentric worldview.
 4 Actually this is the strategy of so- called “Reichsbürger” in Germany, who do 
not acknowledge the FRG to be a legitimate state. By painstakingly interpreting 
every legal document and executive order, they block any interaction with its 
institution.
 5 Here Dean follows Slavoj Žižek’s diagnosis of a demise of “symbolic efficiency“ 
(Žižek 2000, 248).
 6 See Cramer in this volume.
 7 To be clear, by using the notion of the public sphere I am not following the 
119Habermasian idea of an ideal space that now disintegrates under the influence 
of networked media. On the contrary, this space has always already been a 
contested one, a hegemonial but necessary construction to constitute political 
subjects (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, xvii– xviii).
 8 Michael P. Lynch, in his book The Internet of Us, speaks of “Google- Knowing” in 
this context (Lynch 2016, 21– 40).
 9 Friedrich Nietzsche already explained at length how human beings are con-
stantly deceiving themselves in order to be able to survive. However, the salient 
but often overlooked point is that, precisely because of the artificiality of truth, 
humans have to believe in and take responsibility for it. In other words: Simply 
because facts are factitious doesn’t mean they are of a nonbinding nature.
10 Think about the scheme, institutionalized by Greenwich Mean Time. The hands 
on your clock do not bear any meaning by themselves; in fact, they are just two 
(or three) mechanically (or digitally) driven pointers. Only when applied to the 
overall scheme of GMT can they tell you the time.
11 For a more systematic distinction between the real and reality, see Lacan’s 
Seminar XI (Lacan 1977).
12 In information science, the relationship between data, information, knowledge, 
and sometimes wisdom is represented under the acronym DIKW.
13 The weather forecast also gives us an example of how we could deal with a 
postfact world: we normally accept the fact that the forecast, based on data 
from a wide range of sensory devices, only gives us a rough approximation of 
what will happen in the near future. No one would come up with the idea of 
holding the weather service accountable for possible mistakes. Even the usual 
complaints about the inaccuracy of the weather report are part of the narra-
tive, which, and this is the salient point, is a common narrative.
14 Autonomous radio stations of the 1970s and 1980s in Europe (e.g., Radio Alice 
in Bologna) represented for Guattari an example of how collective assemblages 
of enunciation can be produced and preserved.
15 Typically manifested in delusions of persecution or grandeur that are often tan-
tamount to paranoia. But as I want to argue here, paranoia is a much broader 
concept, referring to a feeling of radical insecurity due to a disorder of the 
symbolic system. Such an obscure feeling is often more difficult to endure than 
the belief of someone following.
16 Thanks to Wolfgang Sützl for literally spelling this out for me.
17 For the idea of a “reparative motive” in paranoid thinking, see Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick (2003).
18 See for example the work of Mark Lombardi, whose drawings meticulously 
document various topographies of political and financial power structures.
19 In fact, Conrad, a former member of the National Socialist German Physicians’ 
League (NSDÄB) who also published on the heritability of epilepsy, differenti-
ates between trema, apophenia, and apocalypse, whereas anastrophe works at 
the interface between the apophenic and apocalyptic phase. In this sense a 
catatonic psychosis is to be seen “one level lower” of the apophenic experience 
and is characterized by a sudden turnover into a stable delusional perception 
120 (Conrad 1958, 192). However— for the sake of the argument— I am more 
interested in the actual “turning point” (lat. crisis) in order to understand the 
creative potential of paranoia (Schödlbauer 2016, 123).
20 See beginning of this text.
21 To be clear, the verbal and physical violence is, of course, also affecting non-
refugees, not least Germans, who, due to a nationalist (völkisch) understanding 
of citizenship, are not considered to be “true” Germans. Unfortunately main-
stream media is fueling this racist discourse, by repeatedly reporting on  
“Ausländerfeindlichkeit” (hostility to foreigners), even if the victims are  
Germans.
22 This can also be seen in the rise of a technocratic language to subvert such a 
common ground. Eighty years after Golda Meir’s absolute despair in the face 
of a failing Évian Conference, during which the fate of more than half a million 
Jewish refugees was decided, Europe’s heads of state and government are 
again merely speaking of “numbers” instead of human beings.
23 The idea for such a concept emerged from a conversation with Brian Holmes. 
My gratitude goes to him for his intellectual support.
24 See Chun in this volume.
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